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34 changed files with 759 additions and 2481 deletions

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@ -9,9 +9,10 @@ on:
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
RUSTFLAGS: -Dwarnings
FEATURES: "logging,tls12"
jobs:
fmt:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
@ -20,95 +21,9 @@ jobs:
run: sudo apt-get install -y cmake clang
- name: Check fmt
run: make fmt
test-default:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install dependencies
run: sudo apt-get install -y cmake clang
- name: Lint (default features)
run: make lint FEATURES=""
- name: Test (default features)
run: make test FEATURES=""
- name: Build (default features)
run: make build FEATURES=""
test-tls12:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install dependencies
run: sudo apt-get install -y cmake clang
- name: Lint (tls12)
run: make lint FEATURES="tls12"
- name: Test (tls12)
run: make test FEATURES="tls12"
- name: Build (tls12)
run: make build FEATURES="tls12"
test-logging-tls12:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install dependencies
run: sudo apt-get install -y cmake clang
- name: Lint (logging,tls12)
run: make lint FEATURES="logging,tls12"
- name: Test (logging,tls12)
run: make test FEATURES="logging,tls12"
- name: Build (logging,tls12)
run: make build FEATURES="logging,tls12"
test-mlkem:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install dependencies
run: sudo apt-get install -y cmake clang
- name: Lint (mlkem)
run: make lint FEATURES="mlkem"
- name: Test (mlkem)
run: make test FEATURES="mlkem"
- name: Build (mlkem)
run: make build FEATURES="mlkem"
test-mlkem-tls12:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install dependencies
run: sudo apt-get install -y cmake clang
- name: Lint (mlkem,tls12)
run: make lint FEATURES="mlkem,tls12"
- name: Test (mlkem,tls12)
run: make test FEATURES="mlkem,tls12"
- name: Build (mlkem,tls12)
run: make build FEATURES="mlkem,tls12"
test-fips:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install dependencies
run: sudo apt-get install -y cmake clang
- name: Test (fips)
run: cargo test -p boring-rustls-provider --all-targets --features fips
check-fips:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install dependencies
run: sudo apt-get install -y cmake clang
- name: Check (fips)
run: cargo check -p boring-rustls-provider --all-targets --features fips
- name: Check (fips-precompiled)
run: cargo check -p boring-rustls-provider --all-targets --features fips-precompiled
- name: Lint
run: make lint
- name: Tests usual
run: make test
- name: Build usual
run: make build

View file

@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
members = [
# things that should probably be in boring crate
"boring-additions",
# the main library and tests
"boring-rustls-provider",
# things that should probably be in boring-sys crate
"boring-sys-additions",
# the main library and tests
"boring-rustls-provider",
# tests and example code
"examples",
]
@ -17,11 +17,11 @@ default-members = [
resolver = "2"
[workspace.dependencies]
boring = { version = "5", default-features = false }
boring-sys = { version = "5", default-features = false }
rustls = { version = "0.23", default-features = false }
rustls-pemfile = { version = "2" }
rustls-pki-types = { version = "1" }
tokio-rustls = { version = "0.26", default-features = false }
webpki = { package = "rustls-webpki", version = "0.103", default-features = false }
webpki-roots = { version = "1.0" }
boring = { version = "4", default-features = false }
boring-sys = { version = "4", default-features = false }
rustls = { version = "=0.22.0-alpha.6", default-features = false }
rustls-pemfile = { version = "=2.0.0-alpha.2" }
rustls-pki-types = { version = "0.2.3" }
tokio-rustls = { version = "0.25.0-alpha.4" }
webpki = { package = "rustls-webpki", version = "0.102.0-alpha.7", default-features = false }
webpki-roots = { version = "=0.26.0-alpha.2" }

View file

@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
FEATURES ?= logging,tls12
CARGO_FEATURES := $(if $(strip $(FEATURES)),-F "$(FEATURES)",)
.PHONY: fmt
@ -8,16 +7,12 @@ fmt:
.PHONY: lint
lint:
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets $(CARGO_FEATURES)
.PHONY: check
check:
cargo check --workspace --all-targets $(CARGO_FEATURES)
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -F "$(FEATURES)"
.PHONY: test
test:
cargo test --all-targets $(CARGO_FEATURES)
cargo test --all-targets -F "$(FEATURES)"
.PHONY: build
build:
cargo build --all-targets $(CARGO_FEATURES)
cargo build --all-targets -F "$(FEATURES)"

View file

@ -2,59 +2,55 @@
[![Build Status](https://github.com/janrueth/boring-rustls-provider/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://github.com/janrueth/boring-rustls-provider/actions/workflows/ci.yml?query=branch%3Amain)
A [BoringSSL](https://github.com/cloudflare/boring)-based [rustls](https://github.com/rustls/rustls) crypto provider.
This is supposed to be the start to a [boringssl](https://github.com/cloudflare/boring)-based [rustls](https://github.com/rustls/rustls) crypto provider.
Built on `boring` v5 and `rustls` 0.23.
## Status
This is just a dump of me figuring out how to interface with boring and rustls.
It works to establish a connection and exchange data but I haven't written real tests yet, nor did I cleanup the code or made the effort to make it look nice.
There is probably some code in here that should rather live in the `boring` crate.
## Features
Further, the rustls crypto provider API is still not stable it seems. This works currently with `rustls = 0.22.0-alpha.5`.
No features are enabled by default. The provider ships with TLS 1.3 support
out of the box; additional capabilities are opt-in.
| Feature | Description |
|---|---|
| `fips` | Build against FIPS-validated BoringSSL and restrict the provider to FIPS-approved algorithms only (SP 800-52r2). Implies `mlkem`. See [FIPS mode](#fips-mode) below. |
| `fips-precompiled` | Deprecated alias for `fips`. Matches the `boring` crate's feature name. |
| `mlkem` | Enable the X25519MLKEM768 post-quantum hybrid key exchange group (`draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem-00`). Uses ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) combined with X25519. See [Post-quantum key exchange](#post-quantum-key-exchange). |
| `tls12` | Enable TLS 1.2 cipher suites (`ECDHE-ECDSA` and `ECDHE-RSA` with AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305). Without this only TLS 1.3 is available. |
| `logging` | Enable debug logging of BoringSSL errors and provider internals via the `log` crate. |
## Supported Algorithms
### Cipher Suites
TLS 1.3 (always available):
### Supported ciphers
Currently, supports only TLS 1.3:
```
AES_128_GCM_SHA256
AES_256_GCM_SHA384
CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
```
TLS 1.2 (requires `tls12` feature):
QUIC: not yet supported
TLS 1.2:
```
ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256
ECDHE_RSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256
ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256_GCM_SHA384
ECDHE_RSA_AES256_GCM_SHA384
ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
```
### Key Exchange Groups
Matches boring's default supported group list:
### Key Exchange Algorithms
`ECDHE` with curves:
```
X25519MLKEM768 (0x11ec, requires mlkem feature, TLS 1.3 only)
X25519
secp256r1 (P-256)
secp384r1 (P-384)
X448
secp256r1
secp384r1
secp521r1
```
When `mlkem` is enabled, X25519MLKEM768 is the preferred (first) group in both
FIPS and non-FIPS configurations.
### Signature Algorithms
`FFDHE` with:
```
ffdhe2048
```
### Signature Generation / Verification
```
RSA_PKCS1_SHA256
@ -70,47 +66,6 @@ ED25519
ED448
```
## Post-Quantum Key Exchange
The `mlkem` feature enables the **X25519MLKEM768** hybrid key exchange group
per `draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem-00`. This combines classical X25519
Diffie-Hellman with ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) post-quantum key encapsulation,
ensuring that connections are secure against both classical and quantum
adversaries.
The `fips` feature implies `mlkem`, so X25519MLKEM768 is always available
in FIPS mode.
Wire format (ML-KEM component first in all encodings):
- Client key share: `mlkem_pk(1184) || x25519_pk(32)` = 1216 bytes
- Server key share: `mlkem_ct(1088) || x25519_pk(32)` = 1120 bytes
- Shared secret: `mlkem_ss(32) || x25519_ss(32)` = 64 bytes
Interoperability has been verified against Cloudflare's PQ endpoints
(`pq.cloudflareresearch.com`).
## FIPS Mode
When the `fips` feature is enabled the provider builds against a FIPS-validated
version of BoringSSL and restricts all algorithm selections to those approved
under [SP 800-52r2](https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-52r2), aligned with
boring's `fips202205` compliance policy:
- **Cipher suites**: AES-GCM only (no ChaCha20-Poly1305).
- **Key exchange groups**: X25519MLKEM768 (preferred), P-256, and P-384 only
(no standalone X25519).
- **Signature algorithms**: RSA PKCS#1 / PSS and ECDSA with P-256 or P-384 only
(no P-521, Ed25519, or Ed448).
## Workspace Structure
| Crate | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `boring-rustls-provider` | The main rustls crypto provider. |
| `boring-additions` | Safe Rust wrappers for BoringSSL APIs not yet exposed by the `boring` crate (AEAD, EVP_PKEY_CTX, HMAC_CTX). Intended for upstreaming. |
| `boring-sys-additions` | Raw FFI binding for `CRYPTO_tls1_prf` (internal BoringSSL symbol used for FIPS-compliant TLS 1.2 PRF). Intended for upstreaming. |
| `examples` | Example client binary. |
## License
MIT

View file

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ description = "Boring additions"
publish = false
[dependencies]
aead = { version = "0.5", default_features = false, features = ["alloc"] }
boring = { workspace = true }
boring-sys = { workspace = true }
foreign-types = "0.5"

View file

@ -78,7 +78,11 @@ impl Crypter {
///
/// # Errors
/// Returns the `BoringSSL` error in case of an internal error
///
/// # Panics
/// * If the key length mismatches the `aead_alg` required key length
pub fn new(aead_alg: &Algorithm, key: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ErrorStack> {
assert_eq!(aead_alg.key_length(), key.len());
boring_sys::init();
let this = unsafe {
@ -112,6 +116,10 @@ impl Crypter {
///
/// # Errors
/// In case of an error, returns the `BoringSSL` error
///
/// # Panics
/// * If the `nonce` is not the expected lenght
/// * If the `tag` has not enough space
pub fn seal_in_place(
&self,
nonce: &[u8],
@ -119,9 +127,8 @@ impl Crypter {
buffer: &mut [u8],
tag: &mut [u8],
) -> Result<usize, ErrorStack> {
if tag.len() < self.max_overhead || nonce.len() != self.nonce_len {
return Err(ErrorStack::get());
}
assert!(tag.len() >= self.max_overhead);
assert_eq!(nonce.len(), self.nonce_len);
let mut tag_len = tag.len();
unsafe {
@ -149,6 +156,9 @@ impl Crypter {
///
/// # Errors
/// In case of an error, returns the `BoringSSL` error
///
/// # Panics
/// * if the nonce has the wrong lenght
pub fn open_in_place(
&self,
nonce: &[u8],
@ -156,9 +166,7 @@ impl Crypter {
buffer: &mut [u8],
tag: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), ErrorStack> {
if nonce.len() != self.nonce_len {
return Err(ErrorStack::get());
}
assert_eq!(nonce.len(), self.nonce_len);
unsafe {
cvt(boring_sys::EVP_AEAD_CTX_open_gather(
@ -180,11 +188,11 @@ impl Crypter {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{Algorithm, Crypter};
use super::Crypter;
#[test]
fn in_out() {
let key = Crypter::new(&Algorithm::aes_128_gcm(), &[0u8; 16]).unwrap();
let key = Crypter::new(&super::Algorithm::aes_128_gcm(), &[0u8; 16]).unwrap();
let nonce = [0u8; 12];
let associated_data = b"this is authenticated";
let mut buffer = Vec::with_capacity(26);
@ -199,35 +207,4 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(b"ABCDE", buffer.as_slice());
}
#[test]
fn new_rejects_invalid_key_length() {
let result = Crypter::new(&Algorithm::aes_128_gcm(), &[0u8; 15]);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn seal_rejects_invalid_nonce_and_tag_lengths() {
let key = Crypter::new(&Algorithm::aes_128_gcm(), &[0u8; 16]).unwrap();
let mut payload = [0u8; 8];
let mut short_tag = [0u8; 8];
let short_tag_result = key.seal_in_place(&[0u8; 12], b"", &mut payload, &mut short_tag);
assert!(short_tag_result.is_err());
let mut tag = [0u8; 16];
let wrong_nonce_result = key.seal_in_place(&[0u8; 11], b"", &mut payload, &mut tag);
assert!(wrong_nonce_result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn open_rejects_invalid_nonce_length() {
let key = Crypter::new(&Algorithm::aes_128_gcm(), &[0u8; 16]).unwrap();
let mut payload = [0u8; 8];
let tag = [0u8; 16];
let result = key.open_in_place(&[0u8; 11], b"", &mut payload, &tag);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
}

View file

@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ use std::{
use foreign_types::{ForeignType, ForeignTypeRef, Opaque};
use crate::helper::{cvt, cvt_p};
pub struct HmacCtxRef(Opaque);
unsafe impl ForeignTypeRef for HmacCtxRef {
@ -33,6 +35,20 @@ unsafe impl ForeignType for HmacCtx {
}
}
impl Clone for HmacCtx {
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
unsafe {
cvt_p(boring_sys::HMAC_CTX_new())
.map(|ctx| HmacCtx::from_ptr(ctx))
.and_then(|ctx| {
cvt(boring_sys::HMAC_CTX_copy(ctx.as_ptr(), self.0.as_ptr()))?;
Ok(ctx)
})
}
.expect("failed cloning hmac ctx")
}
}
impl Drop for HmacCtx {
fn drop(&mut self) {
unsafe {

View file

@ -8,52 +8,31 @@ description = "Boringssl rustls provider"
publish = false
[features]
default = []
# Build against a FIPS-validated version of BoringSSL and restrict the
# provider to FIPS-approved algorithms only. This affects:
# - Cipher suites: AES-GCM only (no ChaCha20-Poly1305).
# - Key exchange groups: X25519MLKEM768 (preferred), P-256, and P-384
# only (no X25519, X448, P-521, or FFDHE).
# - Signature algorithms: RSA PKCS#1 / PSS and ECDSA with P-256/P-384
# only (no P-521, Ed25519, or Ed448).
# Implies `mlkem` to ensure the post-quantum hybrid group is available.
# Aligned with boring's `fips202205` compliance policy (SP 800-52r2).
fips = ["boring/fips", "mlkem"]
# Enable X25519MLKEM768 post-quantum hybrid key exchange group
# (draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem-00). Uses ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) combined
# with X25519 for hybrid post-quantum/classical key agreement.
mlkem = ["boring/mlkem"]
# Deprecated alias for `fips`. Matches the boring crate's feature name
# for backwards compatibility.
fips-precompiled = ["fips"]
# Enable TLS 1.2 cipher suites (ECDHE-ECDSA and ECDHE-RSA with AES-GCM
# and ChaCha20-Poly1305). Without this feature only TLS 1.3 is available.
default = ["tls12"]
# Use a FIPS-validated version of boringssl.
fips = ["boring/fips", "boring-sys/fips"]
logging = ["log"]
fips-only = []
tls12 = ["rustls/tls12"]
# Enable debug logging of BoringSSL errors and provider internals via
# the `log` crate. Useful for diagnosing handshake failures.
logging = ["log"]
[dependencies]
aead = {version = "0.5", default-features = false, features = ["alloc"] }
aead = {version = "0.5", default_features = false, features = ["alloc"] }
boring = { workspace = true }
boring-additions = { path = "../boring-additions" }
boring-sys = { workspace = true }
boring-sys-additions = { path = "../boring-sys-additions" }
foreign-types = "0.5"
lazy_static = "1.4"
log = { version = "0.4.4", optional = true }
once_cell = "1"
rustls = { workspace = true }
rustls-pki-types = { workspace = true }
spki = "0.7"
zeroize = "1"
webpki = { workspace = true, features = ["alloc", "std"] }
[dev-dependencies]
hex-literal = "1"
rcgen = "0.12"
hex-literal = "0.4"
rcgen = "0.11.3"
tokio = { version = "1.34", features = ["macros", "rt", "net", "io-util", "io-std"] }
tokio-rustls = { workspace = true }
webpki-roots = { workspace = true }

View file

@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use aead::{AeadCore, AeadInPlace, Buffer, Nonce, Tag};
use aead::{AeadCore, AeadInPlace, Nonce, Tag};
use boring::error::ErrorStack;
use boring_additions::aead::Algorithm;
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
use rustls::crypto::cipher::make_tls12_aad;
use rustls::crypto::cipher::{self, make_tls13_aad, BorrowedPayload, Iv, PrefixedPayload};
use rustls::crypto::cipher::{self, make_tls12_aad, make_tls13_aad, Iv};
use rustls::{ConnectionTrafficSecrets, ContentType, ProtocolVersion};
use crate::helper::log_and_map;
@ -20,8 +18,6 @@ pub(crate) trait BoringCipher {
/// The IV's fixed length (Not the full IV length, only the part that doesn't change).
/// Together with [`BoringCipher::explicit_nonce_len`] it determines the total
/// lengths of the used nonce.
/// Used only by TLS 1.2 code paths.
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
const FIXED_IV_LEN: usize;
/// The key size in bytes
const KEY_SIZE: usize;
@ -29,15 +25,6 @@ pub(crate) trait BoringCipher {
/// The length of the authentication tag
const TAG_LEN: usize;
/// integrity limit
const INTEGRITY_LIMIT: u64;
/// confidentiality limit
const CONFIDENTIALITY_LIMIT: u64;
/// Whether this algorithm is FIPS-approved.
const FIPS_APPROVED: bool;
/// Constructs a new instance of this cipher as an AEAD algorithm
fn new_cipher() -> Algorithm;
@ -45,14 +32,14 @@ pub(crate) trait BoringCipher {
fn extract_keys(key: cipher::AeadKey, iv: cipher::Iv) -> ConnectionTrafficSecrets;
}
pub(crate) trait QuicCipher: Send + Sync {
pub(crate) trait QuicCipher {
/// The key size in bytes
const KEY_SIZE: usize;
/// the expected length of a sample
const SAMPLE_LEN: usize;
fn header_protection_mask(hp_key: &[u8], sample: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 5], rustls::Error>;
fn header_protection_mask(hp_key: &[u8], sample: &[u8]) -> [u8; 5];
}
pub(crate) trait BoringAead: BoringCipher + AeadCore + Send + Sync {}
@ -77,21 +64,19 @@ impl<T: BoringAead> AeadCore for BoringAeadCrypter<T> {
impl<T: BoringAead> BoringAeadCrypter<T> {
/// Creates a new aead crypter
pub fn new(iv: Iv, key: &[u8], tls_version: ProtocolVersion) -> Result<Self, ErrorStack> {
let tls_version_supported = match tls_version {
assert!(match tls_version {
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2 => true,
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3 => true,
_ => false,
};
if !tls_version_supported {
return Err(ErrorStack::get());
}
});
let cipher = <T as BoringCipher>::new_cipher();
if cipher.nonce_len() != rustls::crypto::cipher::Nonce::new(&iv, 0).0.len() {
return Err(ErrorStack::get());
}
assert_eq!(
cipher.nonce_len(),
rustls::crypto::cipher::Nonce::new(&iv, 0).0.len()
);
let crypter = BoringAeadCrypter {
crypter: boring_additions::aead::Crypter::new(&cipher, key)?,
@ -138,10 +123,11 @@ where
{
fn encrypt(
&mut self,
msg: cipher::OutboundPlainMessage,
msg: cipher::BorrowedPlainMessage,
seq: u64,
) -> Result<cipher::OutboundOpaqueMessage, rustls::Error> {
) -> Result<cipher::OpaqueMessage, rustls::Error> {
let nonce = cipher::Nonce::new(&self.iv, seq);
match self.tls_version {
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2 => {
@ -150,57 +136,50 @@ where
let total_len = self.encrypted_payload_len(msg.payload.len());
let mut full_payload = PrefixedPayload::with_capacity(total_len);
let mut full_payload = Vec::with_capacity(total_len);
full_payload.extend_from_slice(&nonce.0.as_ref()[fixed_iv_len..]);
full_payload.extend_from_chunks(&msg.payload);
full_payload.extend_from_slice(msg.payload);
full_payload.extend_from_slice(&vec![0u8; self.crypter.max_overhead()]);
let (_, payload) = full_payload.as_mut().split_at_mut(explicit_nonce_len);
let (_, payload) = full_payload.split_at_mut(explicit_nonce_len);
let (payload, tag) = payload.split_at_mut(msg.payload.len());
let aad = cipher::make_tls12_aad(seq, msg.typ, msg.version, msg.payload.len());
self.crypter
.seal_in_place(&nonce.0, &aad, payload, tag)
.map_err(|_| rustls::Error::EncryptError)
.map(|_| cipher::OutboundOpaqueMessage::new(msg.typ, msg.version, full_payload))
.map(|_| cipher::OpaqueMessage::new(msg.typ, msg.version, full_payload))
}
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3 => {
let total_len = self.encrypted_payload_len(msg.payload.len());
let mut payload = PrefixedPayload::with_capacity(total_len);
payload.extend_from_chunks(&msg.payload);
payload.extend_from_slice(&msg.typ.to_array());
let mut payload = Vec::with_capacity(total_len);
payload.extend_from_slice(msg.payload);
payload.push(msg.typ.get_u8());
let aad = cipher::make_tls13_aad(total_len);
self.encrypt_in_place(
Nonce::<T>::from_slice(&nonce.0),
&aad,
&mut EncryptBufferAdapter(&mut payload),
)
self.encrypt_in_place(Nonce::<T>::from_slice(&nonce.0), &aad, &mut payload)
.map_err(|_| rustls::Error::EncryptError)
.map(|_| {
cipher::OutboundOpaqueMessage::new(
cipher::OpaqueMessage::new(
ContentType::ApplicationData,
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
payload,
)
})
}
_ => Err(rustls::Error::EncryptError),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
fn encrypted_payload_len(&self, payload_len: usize) -> usize {
let per_record_overhead = match self.tls_version {
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2 => self
.crypter
.max_overhead()
.saturating_add(<T as BoringCipher>::EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN),
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3 => 1usize.saturating_add(self.crypter.max_overhead()),
_ => return payload_len,
};
payload_len.saturating_add(per_record_overhead)
match self.tls_version {
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2 => {
payload_len + self.crypter.max_overhead() + <T as BoringCipher>::EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN
}
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3 => payload_len + 1 + self.crypter.max_overhead(),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
}
@ -208,30 +187,23 @@ impl<T> cipher::MessageDecrypter for BoringAeadCrypter<T>
where
T: BoringAead,
{
fn decrypt<'a>(
fn decrypt(
&mut self,
mut m: cipher::InboundOpaqueMessage<'a>,
mut m: cipher::OpaqueMessage,
seq: u64,
) -> Result<cipher::InboundPlainMessage<'a>, rustls::Error> {
) -> Result<cipher::PlainMessage, rustls::Error> {
match self.tls_version {
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2 => {
let explicit_nonce_len = <T as BoringCipher>::EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN;
let tag_len = self.crypter.max_overhead();
let min_payload_len = explicit_nonce_len
.checked_add(tag_len)
.ok_or(rustls::Error::DecryptError)?;
if m.payload.len() < min_payload_len {
return Err(rustls::Error::DecryptError);
}
// payload is: [nonce] | [ciphertext] | [auth tag]
let actual_payload_length = m.payload.len() - tag_len - explicit_nonce_len;
let actual_payload_length =
m.payload().len() - self.crypter.max_overhead() - explicit_nonce_len;
let aad = make_tls12_aad(seq, m.typ, m.version, actual_payload_length);
let payload = &mut m.payload;
let payload = m.payload_mut();
// get the nonce
let (explicit_nonce, payload) = payload.split_at_mut(explicit_nonce_len);
@ -239,9 +211,7 @@ where
let nonce = {
let fixed_iv_len = <T as BoringCipher>::FIXED_IV_LEN;
if explicit_nonce_len + fixed_iv_len != 12 {
return Err(rustls::Error::DecryptError);
}
assert_eq!(explicit_nonce_len + fixed_iv_len, 12);
// grab the IV by constructing a nonce, this is just an xor
let iv = cipher::Nonce::new(&self.iv, seq).0;
@ -252,33 +222,30 @@ where
};
// split off the authentication tag
let (payload, tag) = payload.split_at_mut(payload.len() - tag_len);
let (payload, tag) =
payload.split_at_mut(payload.len() - self.crypter.max_overhead());
self.crypter
.open_in_place(&nonce, &aad, payload, tag)
.map_err(|e| log_and_map("open_in_place", e, rustls::Error::DecryptError))
.map(|_| {
// rotate the nonce to the end
m.payload.rotate_left(explicit_nonce_len);
m.payload_mut().rotate_left(explicit_nonce_len);
// truncate buffer to the actual payload
m.payload.truncate(actual_payload_length);
m.payload_mut().truncate(actual_payload_length);
m.into_plain_message()
})
}
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3 => {
let nonce = cipher::Nonce::new(&self.iv, seq);
let aad = make_tls13_aad(m.payload.len());
self.decrypt_in_place(
Nonce::<T>::from_slice(&nonce.0),
&aad,
&mut DecryptBufferAdapter(&mut m.payload),
)
let aad = make_tls13_aad(m.payload().len());
self.decrypt_in_place(Nonce::<T>::from_slice(&nonce.0), &aad, m.payload_mut())
.map_err(|_| rustls::Error::DecryptError)
.and_then(|_| m.into_tls13_unpadded_message())
}
_ => Err(rustls::Error::DecryptError),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
}
@ -311,10 +278,6 @@ where
let associated_data = header;
let nonce = cipher::Nonce::new(&self.iv, packet_number);
if payload.len() < self.crypter.max_overhead() {
return Err(rustls::Error::DecryptError);
}
let (buffer, tag) = payload.split_at_mut(payload.len() - self.crypter.max_overhead());
self.crypter
@ -327,76 +290,6 @@ where
fn tag_len(&self) -> usize {
<T as BoringCipher>::TAG_LEN
}
fn confidentiality_limit(&self) -> u64 {
<T as BoringCipher>::CONFIDENTIALITY_LIMIT
}
fn integrity_limit(&self) -> u64 {
<T as BoringCipher>::INTEGRITY_LIMIT
}
}
struct InvalidMessageEncrypter;
impl cipher::MessageEncrypter for InvalidMessageEncrypter {
fn encrypt(
&mut self,
_msg: cipher::OutboundPlainMessage<'_>,
_seq: u64,
) -> Result<cipher::OutboundOpaqueMessage, rustls::Error> {
Err(rustls::Error::EncryptError)
}
fn encrypted_payload_len(&self, payload_len: usize) -> usize {
payload_len
}
}
struct InvalidMessageDecrypter;
impl cipher::MessageDecrypter for InvalidMessageDecrypter {
fn decrypt<'a>(
&mut self,
_msg: cipher::InboundOpaqueMessage<'a>,
_seq: u64,
) -> Result<cipher::InboundPlainMessage<'a>, rustls::Error> {
Err(rustls::Error::DecryptError)
}
}
struct InvalidPacketKey<T>(PhantomData<T>);
impl<T: BoringCipher + QuicCipher> rustls::quic::PacketKey for InvalidPacketKey<T> {
fn encrypt_in_place(
&self,
_packet_number: u64,
_header: &[u8],
_payload: &mut [u8],
) -> Result<rustls::quic::Tag, rustls::Error> {
Err(rustls::Error::EncryptError)
}
fn decrypt_in_place<'a>(
&self,
_packet_number: u64,
_header: &[u8],
_payload: &'a mut [u8],
) -> Result<&'a [u8], rustls::Error> {
Err(rustls::Error::DecryptError)
}
fn tag_len(&self) -> usize {
<T as BoringCipher>::TAG_LEN
}
fn confidentiality_limit(&self) -> u64 {
0
}
fn integrity_limit(&self) -> u64 {
0
}
}
pub(crate) struct Aead<T>(PhantomData<T>);
@ -407,31 +300,17 @@ impl<T> Aead<T> {
impl<T: BoringAead + 'static> cipher::Tls13AeadAlgorithm for Aead<T> {
fn encrypter(&self, key: cipher::AeadKey, iv: cipher::Iv) -> Box<dyn cipher::MessageEncrypter> {
match BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(iv, key.as_ref(), ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3) {
Ok(crypter) => Box::new(crypter),
Err(err) => {
log_and_map(
"Tls13AeadAlgorithm::encrypter BoringAeadCrypter::new",
err,
(),
);
Box::new(InvalidMessageEncrypter)
}
}
Box::new(
BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(iv, key.as_ref(), ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3)
.expect("failed to create AEAD crypter"),
)
}
fn decrypter(&self, key: cipher::AeadKey, iv: cipher::Iv) -> Box<dyn cipher::MessageDecrypter> {
match BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(iv, key.as_ref(), ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3) {
Ok(crypter) => Box::new(crypter),
Err(err) => {
log_and_map(
"Tls13AeadAlgorithm::decrypter BoringAeadCrypter::new",
err,
(),
);
Box::new(InvalidMessageDecrypter)
}
}
Box::new(
BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(iv, key.as_ref(), ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3)
.expect("failed to create AEAD crypter"),
)
}
fn key_len(&self) -> usize {
@ -445,10 +324,6 @@ impl<T: BoringAead + 'static> cipher::Tls13AeadAlgorithm for Aead<T> {
) -> Result<ConnectionTrafficSecrets, cipher::UnsupportedOperationError> {
Ok(<T as BoringCipher>::extract_keys(key, iv))
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips") && <T as BoringCipher>::FIPS_APPROVED
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
@ -462,42 +337,24 @@ impl<T: BoringAead + 'static> cipher::Tls12AeadAlgorithm for Aead<T> {
let mut full_iv = Vec::with_capacity(iv.len() + extra.len());
full_iv.extend_from_slice(iv);
full_iv.extend_from_slice(extra);
match BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(
Iv::copy(&full_iv),
key.as_ref(),
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
) {
Ok(crypter) => Box::new(crypter),
Err(err) => {
log_and_map(
"Tls12AeadAlgorithm::encrypter BoringAeadCrypter::new",
err,
(),
);
Box::new(InvalidMessageEncrypter)
}
}
Box::new(
BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(Iv::copy(&full_iv), key.as_ref(), ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2)
.expect("failed to create AEAD crypter"),
)
}
fn decrypter(&self, key: cipher::AeadKey, iv: &[u8]) -> Box<dyn cipher::MessageDecrypter> {
let mut pseudo_iv = Vec::with_capacity(iv.len() + <T as BoringCipher>::EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN);
pseudo_iv.extend_from_slice(iv);
pseudo_iv.extend_from_slice(&vec![0u8; <T as BoringCipher>::EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN]);
match BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(
Box::new(
BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(
Iv::copy(&pseudo_iv),
key.as_ref(),
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
) {
Ok(crypter) => Box::new(crypter),
Err(err) => {
log_and_map(
"Tls12AeadAlgorithm::decrypter BoringAeadCrypter::new",
err,
(),
);
Box::new(InvalidMessageDecrypter)
}
}
)
.expect("failed to create AEAD crypter"),
)
}
fn key_block_shape(&self) -> cipher::KeyBlockShape {
@ -517,13 +374,7 @@ impl<T: BoringAead + 'static> cipher::Tls12AeadAlgorithm for Aead<T> {
let nonce = {
let fixed_iv_len = <T as BoringCipher>::FIXED_IV_LEN;
let explicit_nonce_len = <T as BoringCipher>::EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN;
if explicit_nonce_len + fixed_iv_len != 12 {
return Err(cipher::UnsupportedOperationError);
}
if iv.len() != fixed_iv_len || explicit.len() != explicit_nonce_len {
return Err(cipher::UnsupportedOperationError);
}
assert_eq!(explicit_nonce_len + fixed_iv_len, 12);
// grab the IV by constructing a nonce, this is just an xor
@ -534,10 +385,6 @@ impl<T: BoringAead + 'static> cipher::Tls12AeadAlgorithm for Aead<T> {
};
Ok(<T as BoringCipher>::extract_keys(key, Iv::copy(&nonce)))
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips") && <T as BoringCipher>::FIPS_APPROVED
}
}
struct QuicHeaderProtector<T: QuicCipher> {
@ -553,8 +400,8 @@ impl<T: QuicCipher> QuicHeaderProtector<T> {
first: &mut u8,
packet_number: &mut [u8],
remove: bool,
) -> Result<(), rustls::Error> {
let mask = T::header_protection_mask(self.key.as_ref(), sample)?;
) {
let mask = T::header_protection_mask(self.key.as_ref(), sample);
const LONG_HEADER_FORMAT: u8 = 0x80;
let bits_to_mask = if (*first & LONG_HEADER_FORMAT) == LONG_HEADER_FORMAT {
@ -581,8 +428,6 @@ impl<T: QuicCipher> QuicHeaderProtector<T> {
for (pn_byte, m) in packet_number.iter_mut().zip(&mask[1..]).take(pn_length) {
*pn_byte ^= m;
}
Ok(())
}
}
@ -598,7 +443,7 @@ impl<T: QuicCipher> rustls::quic::HeaderProtectionKey for QuicHeaderProtector<T>
return Err(rustls::Error::General("packet number too long".into()));
}
self.rfc9001_header_protection(sample, first, packet_number, false)?;
self.rfc9001_header_protection(sample, first, packet_number, false);
Ok(())
}
@ -613,7 +458,7 @@ impl<T: QuicCipher> rustls::quic::HeaderProtectionKey for QuicHeaderProtector<T>
return Err(rustls::Error::General("packet number too long".into()));
}
self.rfc9001_header_protection(sample, first, packet_number, true)?;
self.rfc9001_header_protection(sample, first, packet_number, true);
Ok(())
}
@ -628,13 +473,10 @@ where
T: QuicCipher + BoringAead + 'static,
{
fn packet_key(&self, key: cipher::AeadKey, iv: Iv) -> Box<dyn rustls::quic::PacketKey> {
match BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(iv, key.as_ref(), ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3) {
Ok(crypter) => Box::new(crypter),
Err(err) => {
log_and_map("QuicAlgorithm::packet_key BoringAeadCrypter::new", err, ());
Box::new(InvalidPacketKey::<T>(PhantomData))
}
}
Box::new(
BoringAeadCrypter::<T>::new(iv, key.as_ref(), ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3)
.expect("failed to create AEAD crypter"),
)
}
fn header_protection_key(
@ -650,78 +492,17 @@ where
fn aead_key_len(&self) -> usize {
<T as QuicCipher>::KEY_SIZE
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips") && <T as BoringCipher>::FIPS_APPROVED
}
}
struct DecryptBufferAdapter<'a, 'p>(&'a mut BorrowedPayload<'p>);
impl AsRef<[u8]> for DecryptBufferAdapter<'_, '_> {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.0
}
}
impl AsMut<[u8]> for DecryptBufferAdapter<'_, '_> {
fn as_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
self.0
}
}
impl Buffer for DecryptBufferAdapter<'_, '_> {
fn extend_from_slice(&mut self, _: &[u8]) -> aead::Result<()> {
Err(aead::Error)
}
fn truncate(&mut self, len: usize) {
self.0.truncate(len)
}
}
struct EncryptBufferAdapter<'a>(&'a mut PrefixedPayload);
impl AsRef<[u8]> for EncryptBufferAdapter<'_> {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.0.as_ref()
}
}
impl AsMut<[u8]> for EncryptBufferAdapter<'_> {
fn as_mut(&mut self) -> &mut [u8] {
self.0.as_mut()
}
}
impl Buffer for EncryptBufferAdapter<'_> {
fn extend_from_slice(&mut self, other: &[u8]) -> aead::Result<()> {
self.0.extend_from_slice(other);
Ok(())
}
fn truncate(&mut self, len: usize) {
self.0.truncate(len)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use hex_literal::hex;
use rustls::crypto::cipher::Tls13AeadAlgorithm;
use rustls::crypto::cipher::{AeadKey, InboundOpaqueMessage, Iv};
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
use rustls::crypto::cipher::{MessageDecrypter, Tls12AeadAlgorithm};
use rustls::quic::Algorithm as QuicAlgorithm;
use rustls::quic::HeaderProtectionKey;
use rustls::ContentType;
use rustls::ProtocolVersion;
use rustls::crypto::cipher::{AeadKey, Iv};
use crate::aead::BoringAeadCrypter;
use rustls::quic::PacketKey;
use super::aes::Aes128;
use super::{chacha20::ChaCha20Poly1305, BoringCipher, QuicHeaderProtector};
use super::{chacha20::ChaCha20Poly1305, QuicHeaderProtector};
#[test]
fn quic_header_protection_short() {
@ -738,97 +519,14 @@ mod tests {
phantom: std::marker::PhantomData::<ChaCha20Poly1305>,
};
protector
.rfc9001_header_protection(&sample, &mut first[0], packet_number, false)
.expect("valid sample should protect QUIC header");
protector.rfc9001_header_protection(&sample, &mut first[0], packet_number, false);
assert_eq!(&header[..], &protected_header[..]);
let (first, packet_number) = header.split_at_mut(1);
protector
.rfc9001_header_protection(&sample, &mut first[0], packet_number, true)
.expect("valid sample should unprotect QUIC header");
protector.rfc9001_header_protection(&sample, &mut first[0], packet_number, true);
assert_eq!(&header[..], &unprotected_header[..]);
}
#[test]
fn quic_header_protection_rejects_invalid_sample_without_mutation() {
let hp_key = hex!("25a282b9e82f06f21f488917a4fc8f1b73573685608597d0efcb076b0ab7a7a4");
let sample = hex!("5e5cd55c41f69080575d7999c25a5bfb");
let mut header = hex!("4200bff4");
let original = header;
let (first, packet_number) = header.split_at_mut(1);
let protector = QuicHeaderProtector {
key: AeadKey::from(hp_key),
phantom: std::marker::PhantomData::<ChaCha20Poly1305>,
};
let err = protector
.encrypt_in_place(&sample[..sample.len() - 1], &mut first[0], packet_number)
.expect_err("short sample must be rejected");
assert!(matches!(err, rustls::Error::General(_)));
assert_eq!(header, original);
}
#[test]
fn tls13_decrypter_constructor_failure_returns_erroring_decrypter() {
let mut decrypter = Tls13AeadAlgorithm::decrypter(
&super::Aead::<Aes128>::DEFAULT,
AeadKey::from([0u8; 32]),
Iv::from([0u8; 12]),
);
let mut payload = vec![0u8; 8];
let msg = InboundOpaqueMessage::new(
ContentType::ApplicationData,
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
&mut payload,
);
let err = decrypter
.decrypt(msg, 0)
.expect_err("invalid constructor inputs should produce decrypt errors");
assert!(matches!(err, rustls::Error::DecryptError));
}
#[test]
fn quic_packet_key_constructor_failure_returns_erroring_key() {
let packet_key = super::Aead::<Aes128>::DEFAULT
.packet_key(AeadKey::from([0u8; 32]), Iv::from([0u8; 12]));
let mut payload = [0u8; 0];
let enc_err = packet_key.encrypt_in_place(0, &[], &mut payload);
assert!(matches!(enc_err, Err(rustls::Error::EncryptError)));
let dec_err = packet_key
.decrypt_in_place(0, &[], &mut payload)
.expect_err("invalid constructor inputs should produce decrypt errors");
assert!(matches!(dec_err, rustls::Error::DecryptError));
}
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
#[test]
fn tls12_decrypter_constructor_failure_returns_erroring_decrypter() {
let mut decrypter = Tls12AeadAlgorithm::decrypter(
&super::Aead::<Aes128>::DEFAULT,
AeadKey::from([0u8; 32]),
&[0u8; 4],
);
let mut payload = vec![0u8; 8];
let msg = InboundOpaqueMessage::new(
ContentType::ApplicationData,
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
&mut payload,
);
let err = decrypter
.decrypt(msg, 0)
.expect_err("invalid constructor inputs should produce decrypt errors");
assert!(matches!(err, rustls::Error::DecryptError));
}
#[test]
fn quic_chacha20_crypt() {
// test vector from https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001.html#name-chacha20-poly1305-short-hea
@ -841,9 +539,9 @@ mod tests {
let unprotected_header = hex!("4200bff4");
let protector = BoringAeadCrypter::<ChaCha20Poly1305>::new(
Iv::from(iv),
Iv::new(iv),
&key,
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
rustls::ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
)
.unwrap();
@ -862,47 +560,4 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(cleartext, expected_cleartext);
}
#[test]
fn quic_decrypt_rejects_truncated_payload() {
let key = [0u8; <ChaCha20Poly1305 as BoringCipher>::KEY_SIZE];
let iv = [0u8; 12];
let crypter = BoringAeadCrypter::<ChaCha20Poly1305>::new(
Iv::from(iv),
&key,
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3,
)
.unwrap();
let mut payload = [0u8; <ChaCha20Poly1305 as BoringCipher>::TAG_LEN - 1];
let err = crypter
.decrypt_in_place(0, &[], &mut payload)
.expect_err("truncated QUIC payload must fail decryption");
assert!(matches!(err, rustls::Error::DecryptError));
}
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
#[test]
fn tls12_decrypt_rejects_truncated_payload() {
let key = [0u8; <Aes128 as BoringCipher>::KEY_SIZE];
let iv = [0u8; 12];
let mut decrypter =
BoringAeadCrypter::<Aes128>::new(Iv::from(iv), &key, ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2).unwrap();
let min_payload_len =
<Aes128 as BoringCipher>::EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + <Aes128 as BoringCipher>::TAG_LEN;
let mut payload = vec![0u8; min_payload_len - 1];
let msg = InboundOpaqueMessage::new(
ContentType::ApplicationData,
ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2,
&mut payload,
);
let err = decrypter
.decrypt(msg, 0)
.expect_err("truncated TLS1.2 payload must fail decryption");
assert!(matches!(err, rustls::Error::DecryptError));
}
}

View file

@ -11,17 +11,12 @@ impl BoringAead for Aes128 {}
impl BoringCipher for Aes128 {
const EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN: usize = 8;
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
const FIXED_IV_LEN: usize = 4;
const KEY_SIZE: usize = 16;
const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
const INTEGRITY_LIMIT: u64 = 1 << 52;
const CONFIDENTIALITY_LIMIT: u64 = 1 << 23;
const FIPS_APPROVED: bool = true;
fn new_cipher() -> Algorithm {
Algorithm::aes_128_gcm()
}
@ -41,7 +36,7 @@ impl QuicCipher for Aes128 {
const KEY_SIZE: usize = <Self as BoringCipher>::KEY_SIZE;
const SAMPLE_LEN: usize = 16;
fn header_protection_mask(hp_key: &[u8], sample: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 5], rustls::Error> {
fn header_protection_mask(hp_key: &[u8], sample: &[u8]) -> [u8; 5] {
quic_header_protection_mask::<
{ <Self as QuicCipher>::KEY_SIZE },
{ <Self as QuicCipher>::SAMPLE_LEN },
@ -57,17 +52,12 @@ impl BoringAead for Aes256 {}
impl BoringCipher for Aes256 {
const EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN: usize = 8;
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
const FIXED_IV_LEN: usize = 4;
const KEY_SIZE: usize = 32;
const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
const INTEGRITY_LIMIT: u64 = 1 << 52;
const CONFIDENTIALITY_LIMIT: u64 = 1 << 23;
const FIPS_APPROVED: bool = true;
fn new_cipher() -> Algorithm {
Algorithm::aes_256_gcm()
}
@ -87,7 +77,7 @@ impl QuicCipher for Aes256 {
const KEY_SIZE: usize = <Self as BoringCipher>::KEY_SIZE;
const SAMPLE_LEN: usize = 16;
fn header_protection_mask(hp_key: &[u8], sample: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 5], rustls::Error> {
fn header_protection_mask(hp_key: &[u8], sample: &[u8]) -> [u8; 5] {
quic_header_protection_mask::<
{ <Self as QuicCipher>::KEY_SIZE },
{ <Self as QuicCipher>::SAMPLE_LEN },
@ -99,32 +89,19 @@ fn quic_header_protection_mask<const KEY_SIZE: usize, const SAMPLE_LEN: usize>(
cipher: boring::symm::Cipher,
hp_key: &[u8],
sample: &[u8],
) -> Result<[u8; 5], rustls::Error> {
if hp_key.len() != KEY_SIZE {
return Err(rustls::Error::General(
"header protection key of invalid length".into(),
));
}
if sample.len() != SAMPLE_LEN {
return Err(rustls::Error::General("sample of invalid length".into()));
}
) -> [u8; 5] {
assert!(hp_key.len() == KEY_SIZE);
assert!(sample.len() >= SAMPLE_LEN);
let mut output = [0u8; SAMPLE_LEN];
let mut crypter = boring::symm::Crypter::new(cipher, boring::symm::Mode::Encrypt, hp_key, None)
.map_err(|_| rustls::Error::General("failed generating header protection mask".into()))?;
.expect("failed getting crypter");
let len = crypter
.update(sample, &mut output)
.map_err(|_| rustls::Error::General("failed generating header protection mask".into()))?;
let _total = len
+ crypter.finalize(&mut output[len..]).map_err(|_| {
rustls::Error::General("failed generating header protection mask".into())
})?;
let len = crypter.update(sample, &mut output).unwrap();
let _ = len + crypter.finalize(&mut output[len..]).unwrap();
let mut mask = [0u8; 5];
mask.copy_from_slice(&output[..5]);
Ok(mask)
output[..5].try_into().unwrap()
}
#[cfg(test)]

View file

@ -14,17 +14,12 @@ impl BoringAead for ChaCha20Poly1305 {}
impl BoringCipher for ChaCha20Poly1305 {
const EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN: usize = 0;
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
const FIXED_IV_LEN: usize = 12;
const KEY_SIZE: usize = 32;
const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
const INTEGRITY_LIMIT: u64 = 1 << 36;
const CONFIDENTIALITY_LIMIT: u64 = u64::MAX;
const FIPS_APPROVED: bool = false;
fn new_cipher() -> Algorithm {
Algorithm::chacha20_poly1305()
}
@ -38,21 +33,13 @@ impl QuicCipher for ChaCha20Poly1305 {
const KEY_SIZE: usize = 32;
const SAMPLE_LEN: usize = 16;
fn header_protection_mask(hp_key: &[u8], sample: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 5], rustls::Error> {
if hp_key.len() != <Self as QuicCipher>::KEY_SIZE {
return Err(rustls::Error::General(
"header protection key of invalid length".into(),
));
}
if sample.len() != <Self as QuicCipher>::SAMPLE_LEN {
return Err(rustls::Error::General("sample of invalid length".into()));
}
fn header_protection_mask(hp_key: &[u8], sample: &[u8]) -> [u8; 5] {
assert!(hp_key.len() == <Self as QuicCipher>::KEY_SIZE);
assert!(sample.len() >= <Self as QuicCipher>::SAMPLE_LEN);
let mut mask = [0u8; 5];
// RFC9001 5.4.4: The first 4 bytes of the sampled ciphertext are the block counter. A ChaCha20 implementation could take a 32-bit integer in place of a byte sequence, in which case, the byte sequence is interpreted as a little-endian value.
let mut counter_bytes = [0u8; 4];
counter_bytes.copy_from_slice(&sample[0..4]);
let counter = u32::from_le_bytes(counter_bytes);
let counter = u32::from_le_bytes(sample[0..4].try_into().unwrap());
// RFC9001 5.4.4: The remaining 12 bytes are used as the nonce.
let nonce = &sample[4..16];
unsafe {
@ -65,7 +52,7 @@ impl QuicCipher for ChaCha20Poly1305 {
counter,
);
};
Ok(mask)
mask
}
}
@ -104,8 +91,7 @@ mod tests {
let sample = hex!("5e5cd55c41f69080575d7999c25a5bfb");
let hp_key = hex!("25a282b9e82f06f21f488917a4fc8f1b73573685608597d0efcb076b0ab7a7a4");
let expected_mask = hex!("aefefe7d03");
let mask = ChaCha20Poly1305::header_protection_mask(&hp_key, &sample)
.expect("valid QUIC sample/key should produce a mask");
let mask = ChaCha20Poly1305::header_protection_mask(&hp_key, &sample);
assert_eq!(mask, expected_mask);
}
}

View file

@ -24,14 +24,10 @@ impl hash::Hash for Hash {
boring::nid::Nid::SHA256 => hash::HashAlgorithm::SHA256,
boring::nid::Nid::SHA384 => hash::HashAlgorithm::SHA384,
boring::nid::Nid::SHA512 => hash::HashAlgorithm::SHA512,
_ => unreachable!("hash::Hash is only instantiated with SHA-2 digests"),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
}
fn output_len(&self) -> usize {
MessageDigest::from_nid(self.0)
.expect("failed getting digest")

View file

@ -38,6 +38,6 @@ pub(crate) fn log_and_map<E: core::fmt::Display, T>(func: &'static str, e: E, ma
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "log"))]
pub(crate) fn log_and_map<E: core::fmt::Display, T>(_func: &'static str, _e: E, mapped: T) -> T {
pub(crate) fn log_and_map<E: core::fmt::Display, T>(func: &'static str, e: E, mapped: T) -> T {
mapped
}

View file

@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ use std::marker::PhantomData;
use boring::hash::MessageDigest;
use rustls::crypto::tls13::{self, Hkdf as RustlsHkdf};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use crate::helper::{cvt, cvt_p};
@ -68,7 +67,7 @@ impl<T: BoringHash> RustlsHkdf for Hkdf<T> {
let digest = T::new_hash();
let hash_size = digest.size();
let mut prk = Zeroizing::new([0u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize]);
let mut prk = [0u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize];
let mut prk_len = 0;
// if salt isn't set we usen these bytes here as salt
@ -104,7 +103,7 @@ impl<T: BoringHash> RustlsHkdf for Hkdf<T> {
okm: &rustls::crypto::tls13::OkmBlock,
) -> Box<dyn rustls::crypto::tls13::HkdfExpander> {
let okm = okm.as_ref();
let mut prk = Zeroizing::new([0u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize]);
let mut prk = [0u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize];
let prk_len = okm.len();
prk[..prk_len].copy_from_slice(okm);
@ -122,7 +121,7 @@ impl<T: BoringHash> RustlsHkdf for Hkdf<T> {
message: &[u8],
) -> rustls::crypto::hmac::Tag {
let digest = T::new_hash();
let mut hash = Zeroizing::new([0u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize]);
let mut hash = [0u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize];
let mut hash_len = 0u32;
unsafe {
cvt_p(boring_sys::HMAC(
@ -138,14 +137,10 @@ impl<T: BoringHash> RustlsHkdf for Hkdf<T> {
}
rustls::crypto::hmac::Tag::new(&hash[..hash_len as usize])
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
}
}
struct HkdfExpander {
prk: Zeroizing<[u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize]>,
prk: [u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize],
prk_len: usize,
digest: MessageDigest,
}
@ -167,17 +162,9 @@ impl tls13::HkdfExpander for HkdfExpander {
info: &[&[u8]],
output: &mut [u8],
) -> Result<(), tls13::OutputLengthError> {
let max_output_len = self
.hash_len()
.checked_mul(255)
.ok_or(tls13::OutputLengthError)?;
if output.len() > max_output_len {
return Err(tls13::OutputLengthError);
}
let info_concat = info.concat();
unsafe {
cvt(boring_sys::HKDF_expand(
boring_sys::HKDF_expand(
output.as_mut_ptr(),
output.len(),
self.digest.as_ptr(),
@ -185,9 +172,8 @@ impl tls13::HkdfExpander for HkdfExpander {
self.prk_len,
info_concat.as_ptr(),
info_concat.len(),
))
.map_err(|_| tls13::OutputLengthError)?;
}
);
};
Ok(())
}
@ -201,7 +187,7 @@ impl tls13::HkdfExpander for HkdfExpander {
/// This is infallible, because by definition `OkmBlock` is always exactly
/// `HashLen` bytes long.
fn expand_block(&self, info: &[&[u8]]) -> tls13::OkmBlock {
let mut output = Zeroizing::new([0u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize]);
let mut output = [0u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize];
let output_len = self.hash_len();
self.expand_slice(info, &mut output[..output_len])
@ -214,35 +200,3 @@ impl tls13::HkdfExpander for HkdfExpander {
self.digest.size()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use boring::hash::MessageDigest;
use rustls::crypto::tls13::Hkdf as _;
use super::{Hkdf, Sha256};
#[test]
fn expand_slice_rejects_output_larger_than_rfc_limit() {
let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::DEFAULT;
let expander = hkdf.extract_from_secret(None, b"ikm");
let hash_len = MessageDigest::sha256().size();
let mut output = vec![0u8; hash_len * 255 + 1];
assert!(expander.expand_slice(&[b"info"], &mut output).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn expand_slice_accepts_output_at_rfc_limit() {
let hkdf = Hkdf::<Sha256>::DEFAULT;
let expander = hkdf.extract_from_secret(None, b"ikm");
let hash_len = MessageDigest::sha256().size();
let mut output = vec![0u8; hash_len * 255];
expander
.expand_slice(&[b"info"], &mut output)
.expect("HKDF expand at RFC limit should succeed");
assert!(output.iter().any(|byte| *byte != 0));
}
}

View file

@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ use boring::hash::MessageDigest;
use boring_additions::hmac::HmacCtx;
use foreign_types::ForeignType;
use rustls::crypto;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
use crate::helper::{cvt, cvt_p};
@ -20,11 +19,18 @@ struct BoringHmac(pub boring::nid::Nid);
impl crypto::hmac::Hmac for BoringHmac {
fn with_key(&self, key: &[u8]) -> Box<dyn crypto::hmac::Key> {
let ctx = unsafe {
HmacCtx::from_ptr(
cvt_p(boring_sys::HMAC_CTX_new()).expect("failed getting hmac context"),
)
};
let md = MessageDigest::from_nid(self.0).expect("failed getting digest");
Box::new(BoringHmacKey {
ctx,
md,
key: Zeroizing::new(key.to_vec()),
key: key.to_vec(),
})
}
@ -33,35 +39,34 @@ impl crypto::hmac::Hmac for BoringHmac {
.expect("failed getting digest")
.size()
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
}
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct BoringHmacKey {
ctx: HmacCtx,
md: MessageDigest,
key: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
key: Vec<u8>,
}
impl BoringHmacKey {
fn init(ctx: &HmacCtx, key: &[u8], md: MessageDigest) {
fn init(&self) {
unsafe {
// initialize a new hmac
cvt(boring_sys::HMAC_Init_ex(
ctx.as_ptr(),
key.as_ptr() as *const c_void,
key.len(),
md.as_ptr(),
self.ctx.as_ptr(),
self.key.as_ptr() as *const c_void,
self.key.len(),
self.md.as_ptr(),
ptr::null_mut(),
))
}
.expect("failed initializing hmac");
}
fn update(ctx: &HmacCtx, bytes: &[u8]) {
fn update(&self, bytes: &[u8]) {
unsafe {
cvt(boring_sys::HMAC_Update(
ctx.as_ptr(),
self.ctx.as_ptr(),
bytes.as_ptr(),
bytes.len(),
))
@ -69,11 +74,11 @@ impl BoringHmacKey {
.expect("failed updating hmac");
}
fn finish(ctx: &HmacCtx, out: &mut [u8]) -> usize {
fn finish(&self, out: &mut [u8]) -> usize {
let mut out_len = 0;
unsafe {
cvt(boring_sys::HMAC_Final(
ctx.as_ptr(),
self.ctx.as_ptr(),
out.as_mut_ptr(),
&mut out_len,
))
@ -81,28 +86,21 @@ impl BoringHmacKey {
.expect("failed hmac final");
out_len as usize
}
fn new_ctx() -> HmacCtx {
unsafe {
HmacCtx::from_ptr(cvt_p(boring_sys::HMAC_CTX_new()).expect("failed creating HMAC_CTX"))
}
}
}
impl crypto::hmac::Key for BoringHmacKey {
fn sign_concat(&self, first: &[u8], middle: &[&[u8]], last: &[u8]) -> crypto::hmac::Tag {
let ctx = Self::new_ctx();
Self::init(&ctx, self.key.as_slice(), self.md);
self.init();
Self::update(&ctx, first);
self.update(first);
for m in middle {
Self::update(&ctx, m);
self.update(m);
}
Self::update(&ctx, last);
self.update(last);
let mut out = Zeroizing::new([0u8; boring_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize]);
let out_len = Self::finish(&ctx, &mut out[..]);
let mut out = [0u8; 32];
let out_len = self.finish(&mut out);
crypto::hmac::Tag::new(&out[..out_len])
}
@ -114,7 +112,7 @@ impl crypto::hmac::Key for BoringHmacKey {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{SHA256, SHA384};
use super::SHA256;
use hex_literal::hex;
#[test]
@ -143,23 +141,4 @@ mod tests {
hex!("11fa4a6ee97bebfad9e1087145c556fec9a786cad0659aa10702d21bd2968305")
);
}
#[test]
fn test_sha384_hmac_len() {
let hasher = SHA384.with_key("Very Secret".as_bytes());
let tag = hasher.sign_concat(
&[],
&[
"yay".as_bytes(),
"this".as_bytes(),
"works".as_bytes(),
"well".as_bytes(),
],
&[],
);
assert_eq!(tag.as_ref().len(), hasher.tag_len());
assert_eq!(tag.as_ref().len(), 48);
}
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
use rustls::crypto::{self, ActiveKeyExchange};
use crate::helper::log_and_map;
mod dh;
mod ex;
enum DhKeyType {
EC((boring::ec::EcGroup, i32)),
ED(i32),
FFDHE2048,
}
/// A X25519-based key exchange
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct X25519;
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for X25519 {
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<(dyn ActiveKeyExchange + 'static)>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(Box::new(ex::KeyExchange::with_x25519().map_err(|e| {
log_and_map("X25519.start", e, crypto::GetRandomFailed)
})?))
}
fn name(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
rustls::NamedGroup::X25519
}
}
/// A X448-based key exchange
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct X448;
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for X448 {
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<(dyn ActiveKeyExchange + 'static)>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(Box::new(ex::KeyExchange::with_x448().map_err(|e| {
log_and_map("X448.start", e, crypto::GetRandomFailed)
})?))
}
fn name(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
rustls::NamedGroup::X448
}
}
/// A secp256r1-based key exchange
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Secp256r1;
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for Secp256r1 {
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<(dyn ActiveKeyExchange + 'static)>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(Box::new(ex::KeyExchange::with_secp256r1().map_err(
|e| log_and_map("Secp256r1.start", e, crypto::GetRandomFailed),
)?))
}
fn name(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
rustls::NamedGroup::secp256r1
}
}
/// A secp384r1-based key exchange
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Secp384r1;
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for Secp384r1 {
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<(dyn ActiveKeyExchange + 'static)>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(Box::new(ex::KeyExchange::with_secp384r1().map_err(
|e| log_and_map("Secp384r1.start", e, crypto::GetRandomFailed),
)?))
}
fn name(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
rustls::NamedGroup::secp384r1
}
}
/// A secp521r1-based key exchange
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Secp521r1;
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for Secp521r1 {
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<(dyn ActiveKeyExchange + 'static)>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(Box::new(ex::KeyExchange::with_secp521r1().map_err(
|e| log_and_map("Secp521r1.start", e, crypto::GetRandomFailed),
)?))
}
fn name(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
rustls::NamedGroup::secp521r1
}
}
/// A ffedhe2048-based key exchange
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct FfDHe2048;
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for FfDHe2048 {
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<(dyn ActiveKeyExchange + 'static)>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(Box::new(dh::KeyExchange::generate_ffdhe_2048().map_err(
|e| log_and_map("FfDHe2048.start", e, crypto::GetRandomFailed),
)?))
}
fn name(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
rustls::NamedGroup::FFDHE2048
}
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
use boring::{dh::Dh, error::ErrorStack, pkey::Private};
use foreign_types::ForeignType;
use rustls::crypto;
use crate::helper::{cvt, cvt_p, log_and_map};
use super::DhKeyType;
/// This type can be used to perform a
/// Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
pub struct KeyExchange {
dh: Dh<Private>,
pub_bytes: Vec<u8>,
key_type: DhKeyType,
}
impl KeyExchange {
// Generate a new KeyExchange with a random FFDHE_2048 private key
pub fn generate_ffdhe_2048() -> Result<Self, ErrorStack> {
let mut me = Self {
dh: unsafe { Dh::from_ptr(cvt_p(boring_sys::DH_get_rfc7919_2048())?) },
pub_bytes: Vec::new(),
key_type: DhKeyType::FFDHE2048,
};
me.pub_bytes = unsafe {
// generate a new key pair
cvt(boring_sys::DH_generate_key(me.dh.as_ptr()))?;
// get a reference to the pub key
let pubkey = boring_sys::DH_get0_pub_key(me.dh.as_ptr());
// figure out how many bytes we need, round up to the next full byte
let size = (boring_sys::BN_num_bits(pubkey) as usize + 7) / 8;
// alloc a vector with enough capacity
let mut v = Vec::with_capacity(size);
// convert to binary representation
let after_size = boring_sys::BN_bn2bin(pubkey, v.as_mut_ptr());
// size should be what we calculated before
assert_eq!(size, after_size);
// ensure those bytes are accessible in the vec
v.set_len(size);
v
};
Ok(me)
}
/// Generate a shared secret with the other's raw public key
fn diffie_hellman(&self, raw_public_key: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ErrorStack> {
let peer = boring::bn::BigNum::from_slice(raw_public_key)?;
let secret_len = unsafe { cvt(boring_sys::DH_size(self.dh.as_ptr()))? } as usize;
let mut secret = vec![0u8; secret_len];
let secret_len = unsafe {
cvt(boring_sys::DH_compute_key_padded(
secret.as_mut_ptr(),
peer.as_ptr(),
self.dh.as_ptr(),
))?
} as usize;
secret.truncate(secret_len);
Ok(secret)
}
}
impl crypto::ActiveKeyExchange for KeyExchange {
fn complete(
self: Box<Self>,
peer_pub_key: &[u8],
) -> Result<crypto::SharedSecret, rustls::Error> {
let expected_len = self.pub_bytes.len();
if peer_pub_key.len() != expected_len {
return Err(rustls::Error::from(rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare));
}
Ok(crypto::SharedSecret::from(
self.diffie_hellman(peer_pub_key)
.map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"dh::KeyExchange::diffie_hellman",
e,
rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare,
)
})?
.as_ref(),
))
}
fn pub_key(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.pub_bytes.as_ref()
}
fn group(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
match self.key_type {
DhKeyType::FFDHE2048 => rustls::NamedGroup::FFDHE2048,
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::kx::dh::KeyExchange;
use rustls::crypto::ActiveKeyExchange;
#[test]
fn test_derive_dh() {
let alice = KeyExchange::generate_ffdhe_2048().unwrap();
let bob = KeyExchange::generate_ffdhe_2048().unwrap();
let shared_secret1 = alice.diffie_hellman(bob.pub_key()).unwrap();
let shared_secret2 = bob.diffie_hellman(alice.pub_key()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(shared_secret1, shared_secret2)
}
}

View file

@ -1,22 +1,20 @@
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
use std::{mem::MaybeUninit, ptr};
use std::{
mem::MaybeUninit,
ptr::{self},
};
use boring::{
ec::{EcGroup, EcKey},
error::ErrorStack,
nid::Nid,
pkey::Id,
pkey::{PKey, PKeyRef, Private},
};
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
use boring_additions::evp::EvpPkeyCtx;
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
use foreign_types::ForeignType;
use rustls::crypto;
use spki::der::Decode;
use crate::helper::log_and_map;
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
use crate::helper::{cvt, cvt_p};
use crate::helper::{cvt, cvt_p, log_and_map};
use super::DhKeyType;
@ -32,11 +30,16 @@ pub struct KeyExchange {
impl KeyExchange {
/// Creates a new `KeyExchange` using a random
/// private key for the `X25519` Edwards curve
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
pub fn with_x25519() -> Result<Self, ErrorStack> {
Self::ed_from_curve(Nid::from_raw(boring_sys::NID_X25519))
}
/// Creates a new `KeyExchange` using a random
/// private key for the `X448` Edwards curve
pub fn with_x448() -> Result<Self, ErrorStack> {
Self::ed_from_curve(Nid::from_raw(boring_sys::NID_X448))
}
/// Creates a new `KeyExchange` using a random
/// private key for `sepc256r1` curve
/// Also known as `X9_62_PRIME256V1`
@ -50,6 +53,12 @@ impl KeyExchange {
Self::ec_from_curve(Nid::SECP384R1)
}
/// Creates a new `KeyExchange` using a random
/// private key for `sep521r1` curve
pub fn with_secp521r1() -> Result<Self, ErrorStack> {
Self::ec_from_curve(Nid::SECP521R1)
}
/// Allows getting a new `KeyExchange` using Eliptic Curves
/// on the specified curve
fn ec_from_curve(nid: Nid) -> Result<Self, ErrorStack> {
@ -67,7 +76,6 @@ impl KeyExchange {
/// Allows getting a new `KeyExchange` using Edwards Curves
/// on the specified curve
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
fn ed_from_curve(nid: Nid) -> Result<Self, ErrorStack> {
let pkey_ctx = unsafe {
EvpPkeyCtx::from_ptr(cvt_p(boring_sys::EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(
@ -97,24 +105,18 @@ impl KeyExchange {
/// Decodes a SPKI public key to it's raw public key component
fn raw_public_key(pkey: &PKeyRef<Private>) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ErrorStack> {
if pkey.id() == Id::EC {
let ec_key = pkey.ec_key()?;
let mut bn_ctx = boring::bn::BigNumContext::new()?;
let spki = pkey.public_key_to_der()?;
return ec_key.public_key().to_bytes(
ec_key.group(),
boring::ec::PointConversionForm::UNCOMPRESSED,
&mut bn_ctx,
);
}
// parse the key
let pkey = spki::SubjectPublicKeyInfoRef::from_der(spki.as_ref())
.expect("failed parsing spki bytes");
let mut output = vec![0u8; pkey.raw_public_key_len()?];
let used_len = {
let used = pkey.raw_public_key(&mut output)?;
used.len()
};
output.truncate(used_len);
Ok(output)
// return the raw public key as a new vec
Ok(Vec::from(
pkey.subject_public_key
.as_bytes()
.expect("failed getting raw spki bytes"),
))
}
/// Derives a shared secret using the peer's raw public key
@ -127,8 +129,8 @@ impl KeyExchange {
crate::verify::ec::create_public_key(group, point.as_ref())?
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
DhKeyType::ED(nid) => crate::verify::ed::public_key(peer_pub_key, Nid::from_raw(*nid))?,
_ => unimplemented!(),
};
let mut deriver = boring::derive::Deriver::new(&self.own_key)?;
@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ impl crypto::ActiveKeyExchange for KeyExchange {
peer_pub_key: &[u8],
) -> Result<crypto::SharedSecret, rustls::Error> {
self.diffie_hellman(peer_pub_key)
.map(crypto::SharedSecret::from)
.map(|x| crypto::SharedSecret::from(x.as_slice()))
.map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"ex::KeyExchange::diffie_hellman",
@ -161,11 +163,12 @@ impl crypto::ActiveKeyExchange for KeyExchange {
fn group(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
match self.key_type {
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
DhKeyType::ED(boring_sys::NID_X25519) => rustls::NamedGroup::X25519,
DhKeyType::ED(boring_sys::NID_X448) => rustls::NamedGroup::X448,
DhKeyType::EC((_, boring_sys::NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) => rustls::NamedGroup::secp256r1,
DhKeyType::EC((_, boring_sys::NID_secp384r1)) => rustls::NamedGroup::secp384r1,
_ => unreachable!("unsupported key type"),
DhKeyType::EC((_, boring_sys::NID_secp521r1)) => rustls::NamedGroup::secp521r1,
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
}
@ -187,7 +190,6 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
fn test_derive_ed() {
let alice = Box::new(KeyExchange::with_x25519().unwrap());
let bob = KeyExchange::with_x25519().unwrap();

View file

@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
use rustls::crypto::{self, ActiveKeyExchange};
use crate::helper::log_and_map;
mod ex;
#[cfg(feature = "mlkem")]
mod pq;
#[cfg(feature = "mlkem")]
pub use pq::X25519MlKem768;
/// Key type discriminant used by [`ex::KeyExchange`] to select the
/// appropriate peer key parsing and DH derivation logic.
enum DhKeyType {
EC((boring::ec::EcGroup, i32)),
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
ED(i32),
}
/// A X25519-based key exchange
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct X25519;
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for X25519 {
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<dyn ActiveKeyExchange + 'static>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(Box::new(ex::KeyExchange::with_x25519().map_err(|e| {
log_and_map("X25519.start", e, crypto::GetRandomFailed)
})?))
}
fn name(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
rustls::NamedGroup::X25519
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
false
}
}
/// A secp256r1-based key exchange
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Secp256r1;
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for Secp256r1 {
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<dyn ActiveKeyExchange + 'static>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(Box::new(ex::KeyExchange::with_secp256r1().map_err(
|e| log_and_map("Secp256r1.start", e, crypto::GetRandomFailed),
)?))
}
fn name(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
rustls::NamedGroup::secp256r1
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
}
}
/// A secp384r1-based key exchange
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Secp384r1;
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for Secp384r1 {
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<dyn ActiveKeyExchange + 'static>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(Box::new(ex::KeyExchange::with_secp384r1().map_err(
|e| log_and_map("Secp384r1.start", e, crypto::GetRandomFailed),
)?))
}
fn name(&self) -> rustls::NamedGroup {
rustls::NamedGroup::secp384r1
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
}
}

View file

@ -1,364 +0,0 @@
//! X25519MLKEM768 post-quantum hybrid key exchange.
//!
//! Implements the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid key agreement per
//! `draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem-00`. Composes ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203)
//! with X25519, with the ML-KEM component first in all wire encodings.
//!
//! Wire format:
//! - Client key share: `mlkem_pk(1184) || x25519_pk(32)` = 1216 bytes
//! - Server key share: `mlkem_ct(1088) || x25519_pk(32)` = 1120 bytes
//! - Shared secret: `mlkem_ss(32) || x25519_ss(32)` = 64 bytes
use boring::mlkem::{Algorithm, MlKemPrivateKey, MlKemPublicKey};
use rustls::crypto::{self, CompletedKeyExchange, SharedSecret};
use rustls::{Error, NamedGroup, ProtocolVersion};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
const MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES: usize = 1184;
const MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES: usize = 1088;
const X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES: usize = 32;
const X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES: usize = 32;
const X25519_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES: usize = 32;
const CLIENT_SHARE_LEN: usize = MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES + X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES; // 1216
const SERVER_SHARE_LEN: usize = MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES + X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES; // 1120
/// X25519MLKEM768 post-quantum hybrid key exchange group.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct X25519MlKem768;
impl crypto::SupportedKxGroup for X25519MlKem768 {
/// Client-side: generate ML-KEM-768 + X25519 keypairs.
fn start(&self) -> Result<Box<dyn crypto::ActiveKeyExchange>, Error> {
let (mlkem_pub, mlkem_priv) =
MlKemPrivateKey::generate(Algorithm::MlKem768).map_err(|e| {
crate::helper::log_and_map(
"X25519MlKem768::start mlkem generate",
e,
crypto::GetRandomFailed,
)
})?;
let mut x25519_pub = [0u8; X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
let mut x25519_priv = Zeroizing::new([0u8; X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
// SAFETY: X25519_keypair writes exactly 32 bytes to each output buffer.
unsafe {
boring_sys::X25519_keypair(x25519_pub.as_mut_ptr(), x25519_priv.as_mut_ptr());
}
// Wire format: mlkem_pk || x25519_pk
let mut pub_key = Vec::with_capacity(CLIENT_SHARE_LEN);
pub_key.extend_from_slice(mlkem_pub.as_bytes());
pub_key.extend_from_slice(&x25519_pub);
Ok(Box::new(ActiveX25519MlKem768 {
mlkem_priv,
x25519_priv,
x25519_pub,
pub_key,
}))
}
/// Server-side: one-shot encapsulate + DH.
///
/// Must be overridden for KEMs because the server's output (ciphertext)
/// depends on the client's input (encapsulation key).
fn start_and_complete(&self, client_share: &[u8]) -> Result<CompletedKeyExchange, Error> {
if client_share.len() != CLIENT_SHARE_LEN {
return Err(Error::PeerMisbehaved(
rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare,
));
}
// Split client share: mlkem_pk(1184) || x25519_pk(32)
let (client_mlkem_pk_bytes, client_x25519_pk) =
client_share.split_at(MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES);
// ML-KEM encapsulate
let client_mlkem_pk =
MlKemPublicKey::from_slice(Algorithm::MlKem768, client_mlkem_pk_bytes).map_err(
|e| {
crate::helper::log_and_map(
"X25519MlKem768::start_and_complete mlkem parse",
e,
Error::PeerMisbehaved(rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare),
)
},
)?;
let (mlkem_ct, mlkem_ss) = client_mlkem_pk.encapsulate().map_err(|e| {
crate::helper::log_and_map(
"X25519MlKem768::start_and_complete mlkem encap",
e,
Error::PeerMisbehaved(rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare),
)
})?;
let mlkem_ss = Zeroizing::new(mlkem_ss);
// X25519 key exchange
let mut x25519_server_pub = [0u8; X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
let mut x25519_server_priv = Zeroizing::new([0u8; X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]);
let mut x25519_ss = Zeroizing::new([0u8; X25519_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES]);
// SAFETY: X25519_keypair writes exactly 32 bytes to each buffer.
// X25519 returns 1 on success, 0 on failure (e.g., low-order point).
unsafe {
boring_sys::X25519_keypair(
x25519_server_pub.as_mut_ptr(),
x25519_server_priv.as_mut_ptr(),
);
let rc = boring_sys::X25519(
x25519_ss.as_mut_ptr(),
x25519_server_priv.as_ptr(),
client_x25519_pk.as_ptr(),
);
if rc != 1 {
return Err(Error::PeerMisbehaved(
rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare,
));
}
}
// Server share: mlkem_ct(1088) || x25519_pk(32)
let mut server_share = Vec::with_capacity(SERVER_SHARE_LEN);
server_share.extend_from_slice(&mlkem_ct);
server_share.extend_from_slice(&x25519_server_pub);
// Shared secret: mlkem_ss(32) || x25519_ss(32)
let mut secret = Vec::with_capacity(64);
secret.extend_from_slice(&mlkem_ss[..]);
secret.extend_from_slice(&x25519_ss[..]);
Ok(CompletedKeyExchange {
group: self.name(),
pub_key: server_share,
secret: SharedSecret::from(secret),
})
}
fn name(&self) -> NamedGroup {
NamedGroup::X25519MLKEM768
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
}
fn usable_for_version(&self, version: ProtocolVersion) -> bool {
version == ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3
}
}
/// Client-side active hybrid key exchange state.
///
/// Holds the ML-KEM private key and X25519 private key generated
/// during [`X25519MlKem768::start`], waiting for the server's response.
struct ActiveX25519MlKem768 {
mlkem_priv: MlKemPrivateKey,
x25519_priv: Zeroizing<[u8; X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]>,
x25519_pub: [u8; X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
pub_key: Vec<u8>,
}
impl crypto::ActiveKeyExchange for ActiveX25519MlKem768 {
/// Client-side: decapsulate ML-KEM + derive X25519.
fn complete(self: Box<Self>, server_share: &[u8]) -> Result<SharedSecret, Error> {
if server_share.len() != SERVER_SHARE_LEN {
return Err(Error::PeerMisbehaved(
rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare,
));
}
// Split server share: mlkem_ct(1088) || x25519_pk(32)
let (mlkem_ct, server_x25519_pk) = server_share.split_at(MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES);
// ML-KEM decapsulate
let mlkem_ss = self.mlkem_priv.decapsulate(mlkem_ct).map_err(|e| {
crate::helper::log_and_map(
"ActiveX25519MlKem768::complete mlkem decap",
e,
Error::PeerMisbehaved(rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare),
)
})?;
let mlkem_ss = Zeroizing::new(mlkem_ss);
// X25519 derive
let mut x25519_ss = Zeroizing::new([0u8; X25519_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES]);
// SAFETY: X25519 reads 32 bytes from each input and writes 32 to output.
unsafe {
let rc = boring_sys::X25519(
x25519_ss.as_mut_ptr(),
self.x25519_priv.as_ptr(),
server_x25519_pk.as_ptr(),
);
if rc != 1 {
return Err(Error::PeerMisbehaved(
rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare,
));
}
}
// Shared secret: mlkem_ss(32) || x25519_ss(32)
let mut secret = Vec::with_capacity(64);
secret.extend_from_slice(&mlkem_ss[..]);
secret.extend_from_slice(&x25519_ss[..]);
Ok(SharedSecret::from(secret))
}
fn hybrid_component(&self) -> Option<(NamedGroup, &[u8])> {
Some((NamedGroup::X25519, &self.x25519_pub))
}
fn complete_hybrid_component(
self: Box<Self>,
peer_pub_key: &[u8],
) -> Result<SharedSecret, Error> {
if peer_pub_key.len() != X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES {
return Err(Error::PeerMisbehaved(
rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare,
));
}
let mut x25519_ss = Zeroizing::new([0u8; X25519_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES]);
// SAFETY: X25519 reads 32 bytes from each input and writes 32 to output.
unsafe {
let rc = boring_sys::X25519(
x25519_ss.as_mut_ptr(),
self.x25519_priv.as_ptr(),
peer_pub_key.as_ptr(),
);
if rc != 1 {
return Err(Error::PeerMisbehaved(
rustls::PeerMisbehaved::InvalidKeyShare,
));
}
}
Ok(SharedSecret::from(Vec::from(&x25519_ss[..])))
}
fn pub_key(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.pub_key
}
fn group(&self) -> NamedGroup {
NamedGroup::X25519MLKEM768
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use rustls::crypto::SupportedKxGroup;
#[test]
fn hybrid_round_trip() {
let group = X25519MlKem768;
// Client generates keypair
let client = group.start().unwrap();
assert_eq!(client.pub_key().len(), CLIENT_SHARE_LEN);
assert_eq!(client.group(), NamedGroup::X25519MLKEM768);
// Server encapsulates + derives
let server = group.start_and_complete(client.pub_key()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(server.pub_key.len(), SERVER_SHARE_LEN);
assert_eq!(server.group, NamedGroup::X25519MLKEM768);
// Client decapsulates + derives
let client_secret = client.complete(&server.pub_key).unwrap();
// Shared secrets must match
assert_eq!(
client_secret.secret_bytes(),
server.secret.secret_bytes(),
"client and server shared secrets differ"
);
assert_eq!(client_secret.secret_bytes().len(), 64);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_invalid_client_share() {
let group = X25519MlKem768;
let result = group.start_and_complete(&[0u8; 100]);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn rejects_invalid_server_share() {
let group = X25519MlKem768;
let client = group.start().unwrap();
let result = client.complete(&[0u8; 100]);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn exposes_x25519_hybrid_component() {
let group = X25519MlKem768;
let client = group.start().unwrap();
let (component_group, component_pub_key) = client
.hybrid_component()
.expect("hybrid component should be available");
assert_eq!(component_group, NamedGroup::X25519);
assert_eq!(component_pub_key.len(), X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES);
assert_eq!(
component_pub_key,
&client.pub_key()[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES..CLIENT_SHARE_LEN]
);
}
#[test]
fn complete_hybrid_component_matches_x25519() {
let group = X25519MlKem768;
let client = group.start().unwrap();
let (_, client_x25519_pub) = client
.hybrid_component()
.expect("hybrid component should be available");
let mut server_x25519_pub = [0u8; X25519_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES];
let mut server_x25519_priv = [0u8; X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES];
let mut server_x25519_ss = [0u8; X25519_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES];
// SAFETY: X25519_keypair writes 32-byte buffers. X25519 returns 1 on success.
unsafe {
boring_sys::X25519_keypair(
server_x25519_pub.as_mut_ptr(),
server_x25519_priv.as_mut_ptr(),
);
let rc = boring_sys::X25519(
server_x25519_ss.as_mut_ptr(),
server_x25519_priv.as_ptr(),
client_x25519_pub.as_ptr(),
);
assert_eq!(rc, 1);
}
let client_secret = client
.complete_hybrid_component(&server_x25519_pub)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(client_secret.secret_bytes(), &server_x25519_ss);
}
#[test]
fn usable_only_for_tls13() {
let group = X25519MlKem768;
assert!(group.usable_for_version(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_3));
assert!(!group.usable_for_version(ProtocolVersion::TLSv1_2));
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
fn reports_fips() {
assert!(X25519MlKem768.fips());
}
#[test]
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
fn reports_non_fips() {
assert!(!X25519MlKem768.fips());
}
}

View file

@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use helper::log_and_map;
#[cfg(all(feature = "fips", feature = "log"))]
use log::warn;
use rustls::{
crypto::{CryptoProvider, GetRandomFailed, SupportedKxGroup},
SupportedCipherSuite,
@ -14,7 +12,7 @@ mod hash;
mod helper;
mod hkdf;
mod hmac;
pub mod kx;
mod kx;
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
mod prf;
pub mod sign;
@ -23,80 +21,60 @@ pub mod tls12;
pub mod tls13;
pub mod verify;
pub fn provider() -> CryptoProvider {
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
{
provider_with_ciphers(ALL_FIPS_CIPHER_SUITES.to_vec())
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
{
provider_with_ciphers(ALL_CIPHER_SUITES.to_vec())
}
}
pub fn provider_with_ciphers(ciphers: Vec<rustls::SupportedCipherSuite>) -> CryptoProvider {
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
let ciphers = {
let original_len = ciphers.len();
let filtered = ciphers
.into_iter()
.filter(|suite| ALL_FIPS_CIPHER_SUITES.contains(suite))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if filtered.len() != original_len {
#[cfg(feature = "log")]
warn!(
"filtered {} non-FIPS cipher suite(s) from provider_with_ciphers",
original_len - filtered.len()
);
}
filtered
};
CryptoProvider {
cipher_suites: ciphers,
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
kx_groups: ALL_FIPS_KX_GROUPS.to_vec(),
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
kx_groups: ALL_KX_GROUPS.to_vec(),
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
signature_verification_algorithms: verify::ALL_FIPS_ALGORITHMS,
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
signature_verification_algorithms: verify::ALL_ALGORITHMS,
secure_random: &Provider,
key_provider: &Provider,
}
}
/// The boringssl-based Rustls Crypto provider
pub static PROVIDER: &'static dyn CryptoProvider = &Provider;
#[derive(Debug)]
struct Provider;
impl rustls::crypto::SecureRandom for Provider {
fn fill(&self, bytes: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), rustls::crypto::GetRandomFailed> {
impl CryptoProvider for Provider {
fn fill_random(&self, bytes: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), GetRandomFailed> {
boring::rand::rand_bytes(bytes).map_err(|e| log_and_map("rand_bytes", e, GetRandomFailed))
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
fn default_cipher_suites(&self) -> &'static [SupportedCipherSuite] {
#[cfg(feature = "fips-only")]
{
ALL_FIPS_CIPHER_SUITES
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips-only"))]
{
ALL_CIPHER_SUITES
}
}
fn default_kx_groups(&self) -> &'static [&'static dyn SupportedKxGroup] {
#[cfg(feature = "fips-only")]
{
ALL_FIPS_KX_GROUPS
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips-only"))]
{
ALL_KX_GROUPS
}
}
impl rustls::crypto::KeyProvider for Provider {
fn load_private_key(
&self,
key_der: PrivateKeyDer<'static>,
) -> Result<Arc<dyn rustls::sign::SigningKey>, rustls::Error> {
) -> Result<std::sync::Arc<dyn rustls::sign::SigningKey>, rustls::Error> {
sign::BoringPrivateKey::try_from(key_der).map(|x| Arc::new(x) as _)
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
fn signature_verification_algorithms(&self) -> rustls::WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms {
#[cfg(feature = "fips-only")]
{
verify::ALL_FIPS_ALGORITHMS
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips-only"))]
{
verify::ALL_ALGORITHMS
}
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
pub static ALL_FIPS_CIPHER_SUITES: &[SupportedCipherSuite] = &[
#[allow(unused)]
static ALL_FIPS_CIPHER_SUITES: &[SupportedCipherSuite] = &[
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::AES_256_GCM_SHA384),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
@ -109,8 +87,8 @@ pub static ALL_FIPS_CIPHER_SUITES: &[SupportedCipherSuite] = &[
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(&tls12::ECDHE_RSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256),
];
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
pub static ALL_CIPHER_SUITES: &[SupportedCipherSuite] = &[
#[allow(unused)]
static ALL_CIPHER_SUITES: &[SupportedCipherSuite] = &[
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::AES_256_GCM_SHA384),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
@ -128,31 +106,26 @@ pub static ALL_CIPHER_SUITES: &[SupportedCipherSuite] = &[
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(&tls12::ECDHE_RSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256),
];
/// Allowed KX groups for FIPS per [SP 800-52r2](https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-52r2),
/// aligned with boring's `fips202205` compliance policy.
/// Allowed KX curves for FIPS are recommended
/// in [NIST SP 800-186](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-186.pdf)
///
/// The `fips` feature implies `mlkem`, so X25519MLKEM768 is always
/// available and preferred in FIPS mode.
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
pub static ALL_FIPS_KX_GROUPS: &[&dyn SupportedKxGroup] = &[
&kx::X25519MlKem768 as _, // PQ hybrid preferred
&kx::Secp256r1 as _, // P-256
&kx::Secp384r1 as _, // P-384
/// See Sec. 3.1.2 Table 2
/// Ordered in decending order of security strength
#[allow(unused)]
pub const ALL_FIPS_KX_GROUPS: &[&dyn SupportedKxGroup] = &[
&kx::Secp521r1 as _, // P-521 in FIPS lingo
&kx::X448 as _, // Curve448 in FIPS lingo
&kx::Secp384r1 as _, // P-384 in FIPS lingo
&kx::X25519 as _, // Curve25519 in FIPS lingo
&kx::Secp256r1 as _, // P-256 in FIPS lingo
];
/// All supported KX groups, ordered by preference.
///
/// Matches boring's default supported group list exactly:
/// X25519MLKEM768 (when mlkem enabled), X25519, P-256, P-384.
#[cfg(all(not(feature = "fips"), feature = "mlkem"))]
pub static ALL_KX_GROUPS: &[&dyn SupportedKxGroup] = &[
&kx::X25519MlKem768 as _, // PQ hybrid preferred
#[allow(unused)]
pub const ALL_KX_GROUPS: &[&dyn SupportedKxGroup] = &[
&kx::X25519 as _,
&kx::X448 as _,
&kx::Secp256r1 as _,
&kx::Secp384r1 as _,
&kx::Secp521r1 as _,
&kx::FfDHe2048 as _,
];
/// See [`ALL_KX_GROUPS`] (mlkem variant).
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "fips", feature = "mlkem")))]
pub static ALL_KX_GROUPS: &[&dyn SupportedKxGroup] =
&[&kx::X25519 as _, &kx::Secp256r1 as _, &kx::Secp384r1 as _];

View file

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ pub struct PrfTls1WithDigest(pub boring::nid::Nid);
impl crypto::tls12::Prf for PrfTls1WithDigest {
fn for_key_exchange(
&self,
output: &mut [u8; 48],
output: &mut [u8],
kx: Box<dyn crypto::ActiveKeyExchange>,
peer_pub_key: &[u8],
label: &[u8],
@ -29,10 +29,6 @@ impl crypto::tls12::Prf for PrfTls1WithDigest {
let digest = boring::hash::MessageDigest::from_nid(self.0).expect("failed getting digest");
prf(digest, output, secret, label, seed).expect("failed calculating prf")
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
}
}
fn prf(

View file

@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
use boring::{
hash::MessageDigest,
nid::Nid,
pkey::{Id, PKeyRef, Private},
rsa::Padding,
sign::{RsaPssSaltlen, Signer},
@ -21,28 +20,16 @@ const ALL_RSA_SCHEMES: &[SignatureScheme] = &[
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
];
const EC_P256_SCHEMES: &[SignatureScheme] = &[SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256];
const EC_P384_SCHEMES: &[SignatureScheme] = &[SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384];
const EC_P521_SCHEMES: &[SignatureScheme] = &[SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512];
const ALL_EC_SCHEMES: &[SignatureScheme] = &[
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512,
];
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
enum EcCurve {
P256,
P384,
P521,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
enum KeyKind {
Rsa,
Ec(EcCurve),
Ed25519,
Ed448,
}
/// An abstraction over a boringssl private key used for signing.
/// An abstraction over a boringssl private key
/// used for signing
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct BoringPrivateKey(Arc<boring::pkey::PKey<Private>>, KeyKind);
pub struct BoringPrivateKey(Arc<boring::pkey::PKey<Private>>, rustls::SignatureAlgorithm);
impl TryFrom<PrivateKeyDer<'static>> for BoringPrivateKey {
type Error = rustls::Error;
@ -50,83 +37,25 @@ impl TryFrom<PrivateKeyDer<'static>> for BoringPrivateKey {
fn try_from(value: PrivateKeyDer<'static>) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
let pkey = match value {
PrivateKeyDer::Pkcs8(der) => {
boring::pkey::PKey::private_key_from_pkcs8(der.secret_pkcs8_der()).map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"private_key_from_pkcs8",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed loading private key".into()),
)
})
boring::pkey::PKey::private_key_from_pkcs8(der.secret_pkcs8_der())
.map_err(|e| log_and_map("private_key_from_pkcs8", e, ()))
}
PrivateKeyDer::Pkcs1(der) => {
boring::pkey::PKey::private_key_from_der(der.secret_pkcs1_der()).map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"private_key_from_der_pkcs1",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed loading private key".into()),
)
})
boring::pkey::PKey::private_key_from_der(der.secret_pkcs1_der())
.map_err(|e| log_and_map("private_key_from_der", e, ()))
}
PrivateKeyDer::Sec1(der) => {
boring::pkey::PKey::private_key_from_der(der.secret_sec1_der()).map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"private_key_from_der_sec1",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed loading private key".into()),
)
})
_ => Err(()),
}
_ => {
return Err(rustls::Error::General(
"unsupported private key encoding".into(),
));
}
}?;
.map_err(|_| rustls::Error::General("failed loading private key".into()))?;
let kind = match pkey.id() {
Id::RSA => KeyKind::Rsa,
Id::EC => {
let ec_key = pkey.ec_key().map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"ec_key",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed loading EC private key".into()),
)
})?;
let curve_nid = ec_key.group().curve_name().ok_or_else(|| {
rustls::Error::General("unsupported EC key without named curve".into())
})?;
let curve = match curve_nid {
Nid::X9_62_PRIME256V1 => EcCurve::P256,
Nid::SECP384R1 => EcCurve::P384,
Nid::SECP521R1 => EcCurve::P521,
_ => {
return Err(rustls::Error::General(
"unsupported EC private key curve".into(),
));
}
};
KeyKind::Ec(curve)
}
Id::ED25519 => KeyKind::Ed25519,
Id::ED448 => KeyKind::Ed448,
let sig = match pkey.id() {
Id::RSA => rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::RSA,
Id::EC => rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ECDSA,
Id::ED25519 => rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ED25519,
Id::ED448 => rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ED448,
_ => return Err(rustls::Error::General("unsupported key format".into())),
};
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
match kind {
KeyKind::Rsa | KeyKind::Ec(EcCurve::P256 | EcCurve::P384) => {}
KeyKind::Ec(EcCurve::P521) | KeyKind::Ed25519 | KeyKind::Ed448 => {
return Err(rustls::Error::General(
"key type is not allowed in FIPS mode".into(),
));
}
}
Ok(Self(Arc::new(pkey), kind))
Ok(Self(Arc::new(pkey), sig))
}
}
@ -134,105 +63,75 @@ fn rsa_signer_from_params(
key: &PKeyRef<Private>,
digest: MessageDigest,
padding: Padding,
) -> Result<Signer<'_>, rustls::Error> {
let mut signer = Signer::new(digest, key).map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"Signer::new",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed preparing signer".into()),
)
})?;
signer.set_rsa_padding(padding).map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"set_rsa_padding",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed preparing signer".into()),
)
})?;
) -> Signer {
let mut signer = Signer::new(digest, key).expect("failed getting signer");
signer
.set_rsa_padding(padding)
.expect("failed setting padding");
if padding == Padding::PKCS1_PSS {
signer
.set_rsa_pss_saltlen(RsaPssSaltlen::DIGEST_LENGTH)
.map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"set_rsa_pss_saltlen",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed preparing signer".into()),
)
})?;
signer.set_rsa_mgf1_md(digest).map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"set_rsa_mgf1_md",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed preparing signer".into()),
)
})?;
.expect("failed setting rsa_pss salt lengths");
signer
.set_rsa_mgf1_md(digest)
.expect("failed setting mgf1 digest");
}
Ok(signer)
signer
}
fn ec_signer_from_params(
key: &PKeyRef<Private>,
digest: MessageDigest,
) -> Result<Signer<'_>, rustls::Error> {
Signer::new(digest, key).map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"Signer::new",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed preparing signer".into()),
)
})
fn ec_signer_from_params(key: &PKeyRef<Private>, digest: MessageDigest) -> Signer {
let signer = Signer::new(digest, key).expect("failed getting signer");
signer
}
impl BoringPrivateKey {}
impl SigningKey for BoringPrivateKey {
fn choose_scheme(
&self,
offered: &[rustls::SignatureScheme],
) -> Option<Box<dyn rustls::sign::Signer>> {
let scheme = match self.1 {
KeyKind::Rsa => ALL_RSA_SCHEMES
match self.1 {
rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::RSA => ALL_RSA_SCHEMES
.iter()
.find(|scheme| offered.contains(scheme)),
KeyKind::Ec(EcCurve::P256) => EC_P256_SCHEMES
.find(|scheme| offered.contains(scheme))
.map(|&scheme| Box::new(BoringSigner(self.0.clone(), scheme)) as _),
rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ECDSA => ALL_EC_SCHEMES
.iter()
.find(|scheme| offered.contains(scheme)),
KeyKind::Ec(EcCurve::P384) => EC_P384_SCHEMES
.iter()
.find(|scheme| offered.contains(scheme)),
KeyKind::Ec(EcCurve::P521) => EC_P521_SCHEMES
.iter()
.find(|scheme| offered.contains(scheme)),
KeyKind::Ed25519 if offered.contains(&rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519) => {
Some(&rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519)
.find(|scheme| offered.contains(scheme))
.map(|&scheme| Box::new(BoringSigner(self.0.clone(), scheme)) as _),
rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ED25519
if offered.contains(&rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519) =>
{
Some(Box::new(BoringSigner(
self.0.clone(),
rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519,
)))
}
KeyKind::Ed448 if offered.contains(&rustls::SignatureScheme::ED448) => {
Some(&rustls::SignatureScheme::ED448)
rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ED448
if offered.contains(&rustls::SignatureScheme::ED448) =>
{
Some(Box::new(BoringSigner(
self.0.clone(),
rustls::SignatureScheme::ED448,
)))
}
_ => None,
}?;
Some(Box::new(BoringSigner(self.0.clone(), *scheme)))
}
}
fn algorithm(&self) -> rustls::SignatureAlgorithm {
match self.1 {
KeyKind::Rsa => rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::RSA,
KeyKind::Ec(_) => rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ECDSA,
KeyKind::Ed25519 => rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ED25519,
KeyKind::Ed448 => rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ED448,
}
self.1
}
}
/// A boringssl-based Signer.
/// A boringssl-based Signer
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct BoringSigner(Arc<boring::pkey::PKey<Private>>, rustls::SignatureScheme);
impl BoringSigner {
fn get_signer(&self) -> Result<Signer<'_>, rustls::Error> {
fn get_signer(&self) -> Signer {
match self.1 {
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 => {
rsa_signer_from_params(self.0.as_ref(), MessageDigest::sha256(), Padding::PKCS1)
@ -243,6 +142,7 @@ impl BoringSigner {
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 => {
rsa_signer_from_params(self.0.as_ref(), MessageDigest::sha512(), Padding::PKCS1)
}
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256 => {
rsa_signer_from_params(self.0.as_ref(), MessageDigest::sha256(), Padding::PKCS1_PSS)
}
@ -252,6 +152,7 @@ impl BoringSigner {
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA512 => {
rsa_signer_from_params(self.0.as_ref(), MessageDigest::sha512(), Padding::PKCS1_PSS)
}
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => {
ec_signer_from_params(self.0.as_ref(), MessageDigest::sha256())
}
@ -261,25 +162,19 @@ impl BoringSigner {
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512 => {
ec_signer_from_params(self.0.as_ref(), MessageDigest::sha512())
}
SignatureScheme::ED25519 | SignatureScheme::ED448 => {
Signer::new_without_digest(self.0.as_ref()).map_err(|e| {
log_and_map(
"Signer::new_without_digest",
e,
rustls::Error::General("failed preparing signer".into()),
)
})
Signer::new_without_digest(self.0.as_ref()).expect("failed getting signer")
}
_ => Err(rustls::Error::General(
"unsupported signature scheme for private key".into(),
)),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
}
impl rustls::sign::Signer for BoringSigner {
fn sign(&self, message: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, rustls::Error> {
let mut signer = self.get_signer()?;
let mut signer = self.get_signer();
let max_sig_len = signer
.len()
.map_err(|e| log_and_map("len", e, rustls::Error::General("failed signing".into())))?;
@ -300,75 +195,3 @@ impl rustls::sign::Signer for BoringSigner {
self.1
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use boring::{
ec::{EcGroup, EcKey},
nid::Nid,
pkey::{PKey, Private},
rsa::Rsa,
};
use rustls::sign::SigningKey;
use rustls::{SignatureAlgorithm, SignatureScheme};
use rustls_pki_types::{PrivateKeyDer, PrivatePkcs8KeyDer, PrivateSec1KeyDer};
use super::BoringPrivateKey;
fn p256_private_key() -> PKey<Private> {
let group = EcGroup::from_curve_name(Nid::X9_62_PRIME256V1).unwrap();
let ec_key = EcKey::generate(&group).unwrap();
PKey::from_ec_key(ec_key).unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn loads_sec1_ec_private_key() {
let pkey = p256_private_key();
let sec1_der = pkey.private_key_to_der().unwrap();
let key_der = PrivateKeyDer::Sec1(PrivateSec1KeyDer::from(sec1_der));
let key = BoringPrivateKey::try_from(key_der).expect("SEC1 private key should load");
assert_eq!(key.algorithm(), SignatureAlgorithm::ECDSA);
}
#[test]
fn p256_key_chooses_only_p256_scheme() {
let pkey = p256_private_key();
let pkcs8_der = pkey.private_key_to_der_pkcs8().unwrap();
let key_der = PrivateKeyDer::Pkcs8(PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(pkcs8_der));
let key = BoringPrivateKey::try_from(key_der).expect("P-256 private key should load");
let offered = [
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256,
];
let signer = key
.choose_scheme(&offered)
.expect("P-256 key should select P-256 scheme");
assert_eq!(signer.scheme(), SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256);
assert!(key
.choose_scheme(&[SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384])
.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn rsa_key_prefers_pss_when_available() {
let rsa = Rsa::generate(2048).unwrap();
let pkey = PKey::from_rsa(rsa).unwrap();
let pkcs8_der = pkey.private_key_to_der_pkcs8().unwrap();
let key_der = PrivateKeyDer::Pkcs8(PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(pkcs8_der));
let key = BoringPrivateKey::try_from(key_der).expect("RSA private key should load");
let signer = key
.choose_scheme(&[
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256,
])
.expect("RSA key should select an offered scheme");
assert_eq!(signer.scheme(), SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256);
}
}

View file

@ -23,10 +23,11 @@ const PRF_SHA256: prf::PrfTls1WithDigest = prf::PrfTls1WithDigest(boring::nid::N
const PRF_SHA384: prf::PrfTls1WithDigest = prf::PrfTls1WithDigest(boring::nid::Nid::SHA384);
pub static ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
common: rustls::crypto::CipherSuiteCommon {
common: rustls::CipherSuiteCommon {
suite: rustls::CipherSuite::TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
hash_provider: hash::SHA256,
confidentiality_limit: 1 << 23,
integrity_limit: 1 << 52,
},
aead_alg: &aead::Aead::<aead::aes::Aes128>::DEFAULT,
prf_provider: &PRF_SHA256,
@ -35,10 +36,11 @@ pub static ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
};
pub static ECDHE_RSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
common: rustls::crypto::CipherSuiteCommon {
common: rustls::CipherSuiteCommon {
suite: rustls::CipherSuite::TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
hash_provider: hash::SHA256,
confidentiality_limit: 1 << 23,
integrity_limit: 1 << 52,
},
aead_alg: &aead::Aead::<aead::aes::Aes128>::DEFAULT,
prf_provider: &PRF_SHA256,
@ -47,10 +49,11 @@ pub static ECDHE_RSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
};
pub static ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256_GCM_SHA384: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
common: rustls::crypto::CipherSuiteCommon {
common: rustls::CipherSuiteCommon {
suite: rustls::CipherSuite::TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
hash_provider: hash::SHA384,
confidentiality_limit: 1 << 23,
integrity_limit: 1 << 52,
},
aead_alg: &aead::Aead::<aead::aes::Aes256>::DEFAULT,
prf_provider: &PRF_SHA384,
@ -59,10 +62,11 @@ pub static ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256_GCM_SHA384: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
};
pub static ECDHE_RSA_AES256_GCM_SHA384: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
common: rustls::crypto::CipherSuiteCommon {
common: rustls::CipherSuiteCommon {
suite: rustls::CipherSuite::TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
hash_provider: hash::SHA384,
confidentiality_limit: 1 << 23,
integrity_limit: 1 << 52,
},
aead_alg: &aead::Aead::<aead::aes::Aes256>::DEFAULT,
prf_provider: &PRF_SHA384,
@ -71,10 +75,11 @@ pub static ECDHE_RSA_AES256_GCM_SHA384: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
};
pub static ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
common: rustls::crypto::CipherSuiteCommon {
common: rustls::CipherSuiteCommon {
suite: rustls::CipherSuite::TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
hash_provider: hash::SHA256,
confidentiality_limit: u64::MAX,
integrity_limit: 1 << 36,
},
aead_alg: &aead::Aead::<aead::chacha20::ChaCha20Poly1305>::DEFAULT,
prf_provider: &PRF_SHA256,
@ -83,10 +88,11 @@ pub static ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12Ci
};
pub static ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: Tls12CipherSuite = Tls12CipherSuite {
common: rustls::crypto::CipherSuiteCommon {
common: rustls::CipherSuiteCommon {
suite: rustls::CipherSuite::TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
hash_provider: hash::SHA256,
confidentiality_limit: u64::MAX,
integrity_limit: 1 << 36,
},
aead_alg: &aead::Aead::<aead::chacha20::ChaCha20Poly1305>::DEFAULT,
prf_provider: &PRF_SHA256,

View file

@ -3,10 +3,11 @@ use rustls::Tls13CipherSuite;
use crate::{aead, hash, hkdf};
pub static AES_128_GCM_SHA256: Tls13CipherSuite = Tls13CipherSuite {
common: rustls::crypto::CipherSuiteCommon {
common: rustls::CipherSuiteCommon {
suite: rustls::CipherSuite::TLS13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
hash_provider: hash::SHA256,
confidentiality_limit: 1 << 23,
integrity_limit: 1 << 52,
},
hkdf_provider: &hkdf::Hkdf::<hkdf::Sha256>::DEFAULT,
aead_alg: &aead::Aead::<aead::aes::Aes128>::DEFAULT,
@ -14,10 +15,11 @@ pub static AES_128_GCM_SHA256: Tls13CipherSuite = Tls13CipherSuite {
};
pub static AES_256_GCM_SHA384: Tls13CipherSuite = Tls13CipherSuite {
common: rustls::crypto::CipherSuiteCommon {
common: rustls::CipherSuiteCommon {
suite: rustls::CipherSuite::TLS13_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
hash_provider: hash::SHA384,
confidentiality_limit: 1 << 23,
integrity_limit: 1 << 52,
},
hkdf_provider: &hkdf::Hkdf::<hkdf::Sha384>::DEFAULT,
aead_alg: &aead::Aead::<aead::aes::Aes256>::DEFAULT,
@ -25,10 +27,11 @@ pub static AES_256_GCM_SHA384: Tls13CipherSuite = Tls13CipherSuite {
};
pub static CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: Tls13CipherSuite = Tls13CipherSuite {
common: rustls::crypto::CipherSuiteCommon {
common: rustls::CipherSuiteCommon {
suite: rustls::CipherSuite::TLS13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
hash_provider: hash::SHA256,
confidentiality_limit: u64::MAX,
integrity_limit: 1 << 36,
},
hkdf_provider: &hkdf::Hkdf::<hkdf::Sha256>::DEFAULT,

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
use rustls::{crypto::WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms, SignatureScheme};
use rustls::{SignatureScheme, WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms};
pub(crate) mod ec;
pub(crate) mod ed;
@ -61,13 +61,6 @@ pub static ALL_ALGORITHMS: WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms = WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms
],
};
/// FIPS-approved signature verification algorithms per SP 800-52r2.
///
/// Aligned with boring's `fips202205` compliance policy:
/// - RSA: PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS with SHA-256/384/512
/// - ECDSA: P-256 with SHA-256 and P-384 with SHA-384 only
/// (SP 800-52r2 Table 4.1: "The curve should be P-256 or P-384")
/// - No P-521, Ed25519, or Ed448
#[allow(unused)]
pub static ALL_FIPS_ALGORITHMS: WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms = WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms {
all: &[
@ -79,6 +72,9 @@ pub static ALL_FIPS_ALGORITHMS: WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms = WebPkiSupportedAlgor
&rsa::BoringRsaVerifier::RSA_PSS_SHA512,
&ec::BoringEcVerifier::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256,
&ec::BoringEcVerifier::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384,
&ec::BoringEcVerifier::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512,
//&ed::BoringEdVerifier::ED25519, // FIPS 186-5: requires SHA512 but boring doesn't want us to set a digest, correct?
//&ed::BoringEdVerifier::ED448, // FIPS 186-5: requires SHAKE256 but boring doesn't want us to set a digest, correct?
],
mapping: &[
(
@ -113,5 +109,11 @@ pub static ALL_FIPS_ALGORITHMS: WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms = WebPkiSupportedAlgor
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384,
&[&ec::BoringEcVerifier::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384],
),
(
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512,
&[&ec::BoringEcVerifier::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512],
),
// (SignatureScheme::ED25519, &[&ed::BoringEdVerifier::ED25519]),
// (SignatureScheme::ED448, &[&ed::BoringEdVerifier::ED448]),
],
};

View file

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
use boring::{error::ErrorStack, hash::MessageDigest};
use rustls::{pki_types::alg_id, SignatureScheme};
use rustls::SignatureScheme;
use rustls_pki_types::{InvalidSignature, SignatureVerificationAlgorithm};
use crate::helper;
@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ impl SignatureVerificationAlgorithm for BoringEcVerifier {
ec_verifier_from_params(public_key.as_ref(), MessageDigest::sha512())
}
_ => return Err(InvalidSignature),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
.map_err(|e| helper::log_and_map("ec_verifier_from_params", e, InvalidSignature))?;
@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ impl SignatureVerificationAlgorithm for BoringEcVerifier {
fn public_key_alg_id(&self) -> rustls_pki_types::AlgorithmIdentifier {
match self.0 {
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => alg_id::ECDSA_P256,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384 => alg_id::ECDSA_P384,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => webpki::alg_id::ECDSA_P256,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384 => webpki::alg_id::ECDSA_P384,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512 => {
// See rfc5480 appendix-A (secp521r1): 1.3.132.0.35
rustls_pki_types::AlgorithmIdentifier::from_slice(&[
@ -61,33 +61,29 @@ impl SignatureVerificationAlgorithm for BoringEcVerifier {
0x04, 0x00, 0x23,
])
}
_ => unreachable!("BoringEcVerifier only supports configured ECDSA schemes"),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
fn signature_alg_id(&self) -> rustls_pki_types::AlgorithmIdentifier {
match self.0 {
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => alg_id::ECDSA_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384 => alg_id::ECDSA_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => webpki::alg_id::ECDSA_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384 => webpki::alg_id::ECDSA_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512 => {
// See rfc5480 appendix-A (ecdsa-with-SHA512): 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4
rustls_pki_types::AlgorithmIdentifier::from_slice(&[
0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04,
])
}
_ => unreachable!("BoringEcVerifier only supports configured ECDSA schemes"),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips") && !matches!(self.0, SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512)
}
}
fn ec_verifier_from_params(
key: &boring::pkey::PKeyRef<boring::pkey::Public>,
digest: MessageDigest,
) -> Result<boring::sign::Verifier<'_>, ErrorStack> {
) -> Result<boring::sign::Verifier, ErrorStack> {
boring::sign::Verifier::new(digest, key)
}
@ -96,7 +92,7 @@ fn group_for_scheme(scheme: SignatureScheme) -> Result<boring::ec::EcGroup, Erro
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256 => boring::nid::Nid::X9_62_PRIME256V1,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384 => boring::nid::Nid::SECP384R1,
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512 => boring::nid::Nid::SECP521R1,
_ => unreachable!("BoringEcVerifier only supports configured ECDSA schemes"),
_ => unimplemented!(),
};
boring::ec::EcGroup::from_curve_name(nid)
}

View file

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use std::ptr;
use boring::error::ErrorStack;
use foreign_types::ForeignType;
use rustls::{pki_types::alg_id, SignatureScheme};
use rustls::SignatureScheme;
use rustls_pki_types::{InvalidSignature, SignatureVerificationAlgorithm};
use crate::helper::{cvt_p, log_and_map};
@ -41,23 +41,19 @@ impl SignatureVerificationAlgorithm for BoringEdVerifier {
fn signature_alg_id(&self) -> rustls_pki_types::AlgorithmIdentifier {
match self.0 {
SignatureScheme::ED25519 => alg_id::ED25519,
SignatureScheme::ED25519 => webpki::alg_id::ED25519,
SignatureScheme::ED448 => {
// rfc8410#section-3: 1.3.101.113: -> DER: 06 03 2B 65 71
rustls_pki_types::AlgorithmIdentifier::from_slice(&[0x06, 0x03, 0x2B, 0x65, 0x71])
}
_ => unreachable!("BoringEdVerifier only supports configured EdDSA schemes"),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
false
}
}
fn ed_verifier_from_params(
key: &boring::pkey::PKeyRef<boring::pkey::Public>,
) -> Result<boring::sign::Verifier<'_>, ErrorStack> {
) -> Result<boring::sign::Verifier, ErrorStack> {
boring::sign::Verifier::new_without_digest(key)
}
@ -68,7 +64,7 @@ fn ed_public_key_for_scheme(
let nid = boring::nid::Nid::from_raw(match scheme {
SignatureScheme::ED25519 => boring_sys::EVP_PKEY_ED25519,
SignatureScheme::ED448 => boring_sys::EVP_PKEY_ED448,
_ => return Err(ErrorStack::get()),
_ => unimplemented!(),
});
public_key(spki_spk, nid)
}

View file

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use boring::{
rsa::{Padding, Rsa},
sign::RsaPssSaltlen,
};
use rustls::{pki_types::alg_id, SignatureScheme};
use rustls::SignatureScheme;
use rustls_pki_types::{InvalidSignature, SignatureVerificationAlgorithm};
use spki::der::Reader;
@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ impl SignatureVerificationAlgorithm for BoringRsaVerifier {
Padding::PKCS1_PSS,
),
_ => return Err(InvalidSignature),
}?;
_ => unimplemented!(),
};
verifier.verify_oneshot(signature, message).map_or_else(
|_| Err(InvalidSignature),
|res| if res { Ok(()) } else { Err(InvalidSignature) },
@ -73,48 +73,43 @@ impl SignatureVerificationAlgorithm for BoringRsaVerifier {
}
fn public_key_alg_id(&self) -> rustls_pki_types::AlgorithmIdentifier {
alg_id::RSA_ENCRYPTION
webpki::alg_id::RSA_ENCRYPTION
}
fn signature_alg_id(&self) -> rustls_pki_types::AlgorithmIdentifier {
match self.0 {
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 => alg_id::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 => alg_id::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 => alg_id::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 => webpki::alg_id::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 => webpki::alg_id::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 => webpki::alg_id::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256 => alg_id::RSA_PSS_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA384 => alg_id::RSA_PSS_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA512 => alg_id::RSA_PSS_SHA512,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256 => webpki::alg_id::RSA_PSS_SHA256,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA384 => webpki::alg_id::RSA_PSS_SHA384,
SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA512 => webpki::alg_id::RSA_PSS_SHA512,
_ => unreachable!("BoringRsaVerifier only supports configured RSA schemes"),
_ => unimplemented!(),
}
}
fn fips(&self) -> bool {
cfg!(feature = "fips")
}
}
fn rsa_verifier_from_params(
key: &boring::pkey::PKeyRef<boring::pkey::Public>,
digest: MessageDigest,
padding: Padding,
) -> Result<boring::sign::Verifier<'_>, InvalidSignature> {
let mut verifier = boring::sign::Verifier::new(digest, key)
.map_err(|e| log_and_map("Verifier::new", e, InvalidSignature))?;
) -> boring::sign::Verifier {
let mut verifier = boring::sign::Verifier::new(digest, key).expect("failed getting verifier");
verifier
.set_rsa_padding(padding)
.map_err(|e| log_and_map("set_rsa_padding", e, InvalidSignature))?;
.expect("failed setting padding");
if padding == Padding::PKCS1_PSS {
verifier
.set_rsa_pss_saltlen(RsaPssSaltlen::DIGEST_LENGTH)
.map_err(|e| log_and_map("set_rsa_pss_saltlen", e, InvalidSignature))?;
.expect("failed setting rsa_pss salt lengths");
verifier
.set_rsa_mgf1_md(digest)
.map_err(|e| log_and_map("set_rsa_mgf1_md", e, InvalidSignature))?;
.expect("failed setting mgf1 digest");
}
Ok(verifier)
verifier
}
pub(crate) fn decode_spki_spk(

View file

@ -5,71 +5,15 @@ use tokio::{
net::TcpStream,
};
use boring_rustls_provider::tls13;
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
use rustls::version::TLS12;
use rustls::{version::TLS13, ClientConfig, ServerConfig, SupportedCipherSuite};
use boring_rustls_provider::{tls12, tls13, PROVIDER};
use rustls::{
version::{TLS12, TLS13},
ClientConfig, ServerConfig, SupportedCipherSuite,
};
use rustls_pki_types::{CertificateDer, PrivateKeyDer, PrivatePkcs8KeyDer};
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio_rustls::{TlsAcceptor, TlsConnector};
fn tls13_provider_suites() -> Vec<SupportedCipherSuite> {
boring_rustls_provider::provider()
.cipher_suites
.into_iter()
.filter(|suite| matches!(suite, SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(_)))
.collect()
}
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
fn tls12_provider_suites_for_ecdsa() -> Vec<SupportedCipherSuite> {
boring_rustls_provider::provider()
.cipher_suites
.into_iter()
.filter(|suite| {
let SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(suite) = suite else {
return false;
};
suite.sign.iter().any(|scheme| {
matches!(
scheme,
rustls::SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256
| rustls::SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP384_SHA384
| rustls::SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512
| rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519
| rustls::SignatureScheme::ED448
)
})
})
.collect()
}
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
fn tls12_provider_suites_for_rsa() -> Vec<SupportedCipherSuite> {
boring_rustls_provider::provider()
.cipher_suites
.into_iter()
.filter(|suite| {
let SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(suite) = suite else {
return false;
};
suite.sign.iter().any(|scheme| {
matches!(
scheme,
rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256
| rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA384
| rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PKCS1_SHA512
| rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256
| rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA384
| rustls::SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA512
)
})
})
.collect()
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tls13_crypto() {
let pki = TestPki::new(&rcgen::PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256);
@ -77,12 +21,16 @@ async fn test_tls13_crypto() {
let root_store = pki.client_root_store();
let server_config = pki.server_config();
let ciphers = tls13_provider_suites();
let ciphers = [
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::AES_256_GCM_SHA384),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256),
];
for cipher in ciphers {
let config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(Arc::new(
boring_rustls_provider::provider_with_ciphers([cipher].to_vec()),
))
let config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(PROVIDER)
.with_cipher_suites(&[cipher])
.with_safe_default_kx_groups()
.with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS13])
.unwrap()
.with_root_certificates(root_store.clone())
@ -92,389 +40,6 @@ async fn test_tls13_crypto() {
}
}
#[test]
fn provider_kx_groups_reject_invalid_peer_keys_without_panicking() {
for group in boring_rustls_provider::provider().kx_groups {
let kx = group.start().expect("provider KX group should initialize");
let outcome = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| kx.complete(&[])));
assert!(outcome.is_ok(), "KX group {:?} panicked", group.name());
assert!(
outcome.expect("already checked for panic").is_err(),
"KX group {:?} accepted an invalid key share",
group.name()
);
}
}
#[test]
fn provider_verifiers_reject_malformed_inputs_without_panicking() {
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider();
for (index, verifier) in provider
.signature_verification_algorithms
.all
.iter()
.enumerate()
{
let outcome = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
verifier.verify_signature(&[], b"message", &[])
}));
assert!(outcome.is_ok(), "verifier #{index} panicked");
assert!(
outcome.expect("already checked for panic").is_err(),
"verifier #{index} accepted malformed inputs"
);
}
}
/// Self-to-self TLS 1.3 handshake using only the X25519MLKEM768 PQ hybrid group.
#[cfg(feature = "mlkem")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tls13_pq_x25519_mlkem768() {
use rustls::NamedGroup;
let pki = TestPki::new(&rcgen::PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256);
let root_store = pki.client_root_store();
// Build server with only X25519MLKEM768
let server_provider =
boring_rustls_provider::provider_with_ciphers(vec![SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(
&tls13::AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
)]);
let server_config = {
let mut cfg = ServerConfig::builder_with_provider(Arc::new(server_provider))
.with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS13])
.unwrap()
.with_no_client_auth()
.with_single_cert(
vec![pki.server_cert_der.clone()],
pki.server_key_der.clone_key(),
)
.unwrap();
cfg.key_log = Arc::new(rustls::KeyLogFile::new());
Arc::new(cfg)
};
// Build client with only X25519MLKEM768
let client_provider =
boring_rustls_provider::provider_with_ciphers(vec![SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(
&tls13::AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
)]);
let config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(Arc::new(client_provider))
.with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS13])
.unwrap()
.with_root_certificates(root_store)
.with_no_client_auth();
let negotiated_group = do_exchange(config, server_config).await;
assert_eq!(negotiated_group, Some(NamedGroup::X25519MLKEM768));
}
/// Connect to Cloudflare's PQ test endpoint and verify X25519MLKEM768
/// was actually negotiated by checking the `/cdn-cgi/trace` response.
/// Marked `#[ignore]` because it depends on an external service.
#[cfg(feature = "mlkem")]
#[ignore]
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_pq_interop_cloudflare() {
let mut root_store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
root_store.extend(webpki_roots::TLS_SERVER_ROOTS.iter().cloned());
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider();
let config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(Arc::new(provider))
.with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS13])
.unwrap()
.with_root_certificates(root_store)
.with_no_client_auth();
let connector = TlsConnector::from(Arc::new(config));
let stream = TcpStream::connect("pq.cloudflareresearch.com:443")
.await
.unwrap();
let mut stream = connector
.connect(
rustls_pki_types::ServerName::try_from("pq.cloudflareresearch.com").unwrap(),
stream,
)
.await
.expect("TLS handshake with pq.cloudflareresearch.com failed");
// Hit the trace endpoint which reports negotiated TLS parameters
stream
.write_all(
b"GET /cdn-cgi/trace HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: pq.cloudflareresearch.com\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
)
.await
.unwrap();
let mut buf = Vec::new();
stream.read_to_end(&mut buf).await.unwrap();
let response = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf);
// Verify TLS 1.3 was used
assert!(
response.contains("tls=TLSv1.3"),
"expected TLSv1.3, got: {response}"
);
// Verify X25519MLKEM768 was negotiated as the key exchange
assert!(
response.contains("kex=X25519MLKEM768"),
"expected kex=X25519MLKEM768, got: {response}"
);
}
/// Connect to Cloudflare with TLS 1.2 forced and verify that a classical
/// key exchange is used (PQ groups are TLS 1.3 only).
/// Marked `#[ignore]` because it depends on an external service.
#[cfg(all(feature = "mlkem", feature = "tls12"))]
#[ignore]
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tls12_interop_cloudflare_no_pq() {
let mut root_store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
root_store.extend(webpki_roots::TLS_SERVER_ROOTS.iter().cloned());
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider();
let config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(Arc::new(provider))
.with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS12])
.unwrap()
.with_root_certificates(root_store)
.with_no_client_auth();
let connector = TlsConnector::from(Arc::new(config));
let stream = TcpStream::connect("pq.cloudflareresearch.com:443")
.await
.unwrap();
let mut stream = connector
.connect(
rustls_pki_types::ServerName::try_from("pq.cloudflareresearch.com").unwrap(),
stream,
)
.await
.expect("TLS handshake with pq.cloudflareresearch.com (TLS 1.2) failed");
stream
.write_all(
b"GET /cdn-cgi/trace HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: pq.cloudflareresearch.com\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
)
.await
.unwrap();
let mut buf = Vec::new();
stream.read_to_end(&mut buf).await.unwrap();
let response = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf);
// Verify TLS 1.2 was used
assert!(
response.contains("tls=TLSv1.2"),
"expected TLSv1.2, got: {response}"
);
// Verify a classical key exchange was used (not PQ)
assert!(
!response.contains("kex=X25519MLKEM768"),
"TLS 1.2 should not use PQ key exchange, got: {response}"
);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
fn is_fips_enabled() {
assert!(boring::fips::enabled());
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
fn fips_provider_excludes_chacha20_cipher_suites() {
use rustls::CipherSuite;
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider();
let disallowed = [
CipherSuite::TLS13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite::TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite::TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
];
for suite in provider.cipher_suites {
let selected = suite.suite();
assert!(
!disallowed.contains(&selected),
"FIPS provider exposed disallowed cipher suite: {selected:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
fn fips_provider_with_ciphers_filters_non_fips_input() {
use rustls::CipherSuite;
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider_with_ciphers(vec![
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
]);
let suites = provider
.cipher_suites
.iter()
.map(|suite| suite.suite())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(suites, vec![CipherSuite::TLS13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256]);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
fn fips_provider_restricts_kx_groups() {
use rustls::NamedGroup;
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider();
let groups = provider
.kx_groups
.iter()
.map(|group| group.name())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
// fips implies mlkem, so X25519MLKEM768 must be present and preferred
assert_eq!(
groups[0],
NamedGroup::X25519MLKEM768,
"X25519MLKEM768 should be the first (preferred) FIPS KX group"
);
assert!(groups.contains(&NamedGroup::secp256r1));
assert!(groups.contains(&NamedGroup::secp384r1));
for group in &groups {
assert!(
matches!(
group,
NamedGroup::X25519MLKEM768 | NamedGroup::secp256r1 | NamedGroup::secp384r1
),
"FIPS provider exposed disallowed KX group: {group:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "fips")]
fn fips_provider_excludes_disallowed_signature_schemes() {
use rustls::SignatureScheme;
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider();
let schemes = provider
.signature_verification_algorithms
.mapping
.iter()
.map(|(scheme, _)| *scheme)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert!(schemes.contains(&SignatureScheme::RSA_PSS_SHA256));
assert!(schemes.contains(&SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP256_SHA256));
for disallowed in [
SignatureScheme::ECDSA_NISTP521_SHA512,
SignatureScheme::ED25519,
SignatureScheme::ED448,
] {
assert!(
!schemes.contains(&disallowed),
"FIPS provider exposed disallowed signature scheme: {disallowed:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
fn is_fips_disabled() {
assert!(!boring::fips::enabled());
}
#[test]
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
fn non_fips_provider_keeps_non_fips_algorithms() {
use rustls::{CipherSuite, NamedGroup};
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider();
assert!(provider
.cipher_suites
.iter()
.any(|suite| { suite.suite() == CipherSuite::TLS13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 }));
assert!(provider
.kx_groups
.iter()
.any(|group| group.name() == NamedGroup::X25519));
}
#[test]
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
fn non_fips_provider_components_report_non_fips() {
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider();
assert!(!provider.secure_random.fips());
assert!(!provider.key_provider.fips());
}
#[test]
#[cfg(not(feature = "fips"))]
fn non_fips_provider_with_ciphers_keeps_requested_suites() {
use rustls::CipherSuite;
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider_with_ciphers(vec![
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls13(&tls13::AES_128_GCM_SHA256),
]);
let suites = provider
.cipher_suites
.iter()
.map(|suite| suite.suite())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(
suites,
vec![
CipherSuite::TLS13_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite::TLS13_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
]
);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(all(not(feature = "fips"), feature = "mlkem"))]
fn non_fips_provider_includes_pq_group() {
use rustls::NamedGroup;
let provider = boring_rustls_provider::provider();
let groups = provider
.kx_groups
.iter()
.map(|group| group.name())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(
groups[0],
NamedGroup::X25519MLKEM768,
"X25519MLKEM768 should be the first (preferred) KX group"
);
assert_eq!(
groups[1],
NamedGroup::X25519,
"X25519 should be the first classical fallback"
);
assert_eq!(
groups[2],
NamedGroup::secp256r1,
"P-256 should follow X25519, matching boring's default order"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tls12_ec_crypto() {
let pki = TestPki::new(&rcgen::PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256);
@ -482,12 +47,16 @@ async fn test_tls12_ec_crypto() {
let root_store = pki.client_root_store();
let server_config = pki.server_config();
let ciphers = tls12_provider_suites_for_ecdsa();
let ciphers = [
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(&tls12::ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(&tls12::ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256_GCM_SHA384),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(&tls12::ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256),
];
for cipher in ciphers {
let config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(Arc::new(
boring_rustls_provider::provider_with_ciphers([cipher].to_vec()),
))
let config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(PROVIDER)
.with_cipher_suites(&[cipher])
.with_safe_default_kx_groups()
.with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS12])
.unwrap()
.with_root_certificates(root_store.clone())
@ -497,7 +66,6 @@ async fn test_tls12_ec_crypto() {
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_tls12_rsa_crypto() {
let pki = TestPki::new(&rcgen::PKCS_RSA_SHA256);
@ -505,12 +73,16 @@ async fn test_tls12_rsa_crypto() {
let root_store = pki.client_root_store();
let server_config = pki.server_config();
let ciphers = tls12_provider_suites_for_rsa();
let ciphers = [
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(&tls12::ECDHE_RSA_AES128_GCM_SHA256),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(&tls12::ECDHE_RSA_AES256_GCM_SHA384),
SupportedCipherSuite::Tls12(&tls12::ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256),
];
for cipher in ciphers {
let config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(Arc::new(
boring_rustls_provider::provider_with_ciphers([cipher].to_vec()),
))
let config = ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(PROVIDER)
.with_cipher_suites(&[cipher])
.with_safe_default_kx_groups()
.with_protocol_versions(&[&TLS12])
.unwrap()
.with_root_certificates(root_store.clone())
@ -524,10 +96,7 @@ async fn new_listener() -> TcpListener {
TcpListener::bind("localhost:0").await.unwrap()
}
async fn do_exchange(
config: ClientConfig,
server_config: Arc<ServerConfig>,
) -> Option<rustls::NamedGroup> {
async fn do_exchange(config: ClientConfig, server_config: Arc<ServerConfig>) {
let listener = new_listener().await;
let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
tokio::spawn(spawn_echo_server(listener, server_config.clone()));
@ -543,18 +112,10 @@ async fn do_exchange(
.await
.unwrap();
let negotiated_group = stream
.get_ref()
.1
.negotiated_key_exchange_group()
.map(|group| group.name());
stream.write_all(b"HELLO").await.unwrap();
let mut buf = Vec::new();
let bytes = stream.read_to_end(&mut buf).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(&buf[..bytes], b"HELLO");
negotiated_group
}
async fn spawn_echo_server(listener: TcpListener, config: Arc<ServerConfig>) {
@ -615,15 +176,8 @@ impl TestPki {
}
fn server_config(self) -> Arc<ServerConfig> {
#[cfg(feature = "tls12")]
let versions: &[&'static rustls::SupportedProtocolVersion] = &[&TLS12, &TLS13];
#[cfg(not(feature = "tls12"))]
let versions: &[&'static rustls::SupportedProtocolVersion] = &[&TLS13];
let mut server_config =
ServerConfig::builder_with_provider(Arc::new(boring_rustls_provider::provider()))
.with_protocol_versions(versions)
.unwrap()
let mut server_config = ServerConfig::builder_with_provider(PROVIDER)
.with_safe_defaults()
.with_no_client_auth()
.with_single_cert(vec![self.server_cert_der], self.server_key_der)
.unwrap();

View file

@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
const BANNED_TOKENS: &[&str] = &[
"unwrap(",
"expect(",
"assert!(",
"assert_eq!(",
"assert_ne!(",
"panic!(",
"unreachable!(",
"unimplemented!(",
];
struct AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: &'static str,
line_fragment: &'static str,
reason: &'static str,
}
const ALLOWLIST: &[AllowlistedPanic] = &[
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hash.rs",
line_fragment: "failed getting hash digest",
reason: "rustls hash trait is infallible; provider currently cannot surface this as Result",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hash.rs",
line_fragment: "failed getting hasher",
reason: "rustls hash trait is infallible; provider currently cannot surface this as Result",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hash.rs",
line_fragment: "hash::Hash is only instantiated with SHA-2 digests",
reason: "constructor invariant over static hash-provider constants",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hash.rs",
line_fragment: "failed getting digest",
reason: "rustls hash trait is infallible; provider currently cannot surface this as Result",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hash.rs",
line_fragment: "failed finishing hash",
reason: "rustls hash trait is infallible; provider currently cannot surface this as Result",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hash.rs",
line_fragment: "failed adding data to hash",
reason: "rustls hash trait is infallible; provider currently cannot surface this as Result",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hkdf.rs",
line_fragment: "HKDF_extract failed",
reason: "rustls hkdf trait is infallible at this call site",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hkdf.rs",
line_fragment: "HMAC failed",
reason: "rustls hkdf trait is infallible at this call site",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hkdf.rs",
line_fragment: "failed hkdf expand",
reason: "expand_block API is infallible in rustls",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hmac.rs",
line_fragment: "failed getting digest",
reason: "rustls hmac trait is infallible at this call site",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hmac.rs",
line_fragment: "failed initializing hmac",
reason: "rustls hmac trait is infallible at this call site",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hmac.rs",
line_fragment: "failed updating hmac",
reason: "rustls hmac trait is infallible at this call site",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hmac.rs",
line_fragment: "failed hmac final",
reason: "rustls hmac trait is infallible at this call site",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/hmac.rs",
line_fragment: "failed creating HMAC_CTX",
reason: "rustls hmac trait is infallible at this call site",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/prf.rs",
line_fragment: "failed getting digest",
reason: "rustls tls12::Prf::for_secret is infallible",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/prf.rs",
line_fragment: "failed calculating prf",
reason: "rustls tls12::Prf::for_secret is infallible",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/verify/rsa.rs",
line_fragment: "BoringRsaVerifier only supports configured RSA schemes",
reason: "static verifier configuration invariant",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/verify/ec.rs",
line_fragment: "BoringEcVerifier only supports configured ECDSA schemes",
reason: "static verifier configuration invariant",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/verify/ed.rs",
line_fragment: "BoringEdVerifier only supports configured EdDSA schemes",
reason: "static verifier configuration invariant",
},
AllowlistedPanic {
path_suffix: "boring-rustls-provider/src/kx/ex.rs",
line_fragment: "unsupported key type",
reason: "static KX type invariant",
},
];
#[test]
fn no_unreviewed_runtime_panic_constructs() {
let manifest_dir = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
let repo_root = manifest_dir
.parent()
.expect("crate must be within repository root");
let mut violations = Vec::new();
for root in [
repo_root.join("boring-rustls-provider/src"),
repo_root.join("boring-additions/src"),
] {
collect_rs_files(&root)
.expect("must be able to enumerate source files")
.into_iter()
.for_each(|path| {
let rel = path
.strip_prefix(repo_root)
.expect("path should be under repo root")
.to_string_lossy()
.to_string();
let content = fs::read_to_string(&path)
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("failed to read {}: {e}", rel));
for (line_no, line) in runtime_lines_only(&content) {
let trimmed = line.trim();
if trimmed.starts_with("//") {
continue;
}
for token in BANNED_TOKENS {
if !line.contains(token) {
continue;
}
let allowed = ALLOWLIST.iter().find(|allow| {
rel.ends_with(allow.path_suffix) && line.contains(allow.line_fragment)
});
if allowed.is_none() {
violations.push(format!("{rel}:{line_no}: {trimmed}"));
}
}
}
});
}
if !violations.is_empty() {
violations.sort();
panic!(
"found unreviewed panic constructs in runtime code:\n{}\n\nIf intentional, add a targeted allowlist entry with rationale.",
violations.join("\n")
);
}
}
#[test]
fn allowlist_entries_have_matching_runtime_lines() {
let manifest_dir = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
let repo_root = manifest_dir
.parent()
.expect("crate must be within repository root");
let mut missing = Vec::new();
for entry in ALLOWLIST {
let path = repo_root.join(entry.path_suffix);
let content = fs::read_to_string(&path)
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("failed to read {}: {e}", entry.path_suffix));
let found = runtime_lines_only(&content)
.into_iter()
.any(|(_, line)| line.contains(entry.line_fragment));
if !found {
missing.push(format!(
"{} :: '{}' ({})",
entry.path_suffix, entry.line_fragment, entry.reason
));
}
}
if !missing.is_empty() {
missing.sort();
panic!(
"panic allowlist entries no longer match runtime code:\n{}",
missing.join("\n")
);
}
}
fn runtime_lines_only(content: &str) -> Vec<(usize, &str)> {
let mut lines = Vec::new();
for (index, line) in content.lines().enumerate() {
if line.trim_start().starts_with("#[cfg(test)]") {
break;
}
lines.push((index + 1, line));
}
lines
}
fn collect_rs_files(root: &Path) -> Result<Vec<PathBuf>, std::io::Error> {
let mut files = Vec::new();
collect_rs_files_rec(root, &mut files)?;
Ok(files)
}
fn collect_rs_files_rec(root: &Path, acc: &mut Vec<PathBuf>) -> Result<(), std::io::Error> {
for entry in fs::read_dir(root)? {
let entry = entry?;
let path = entry.path();
if path.is_dir() {
collect_rs_files_rec(&path, acc)?;
continue;
}
if path.extension().and_then(|ext| ext.to_str()) == Some("rs") {
acc.push(path);
}
}
Ok(())
}

View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
use std::ffi;
extern "C" {
/// Calculates `out_len` bytes of the TLS PRF, using `digest`, and
/// Calculates `out_len` bytes of the TLS PDF, using `digest`, and
/// writes them to `out`. It returns one on success and zero on error.
///
/// This isn't part of the public headers in `BoringSSL` but it is exported

View file

@ -7,7 +7,15 @@ description = "Boring Rustls provider example code and tests."
publish = false
[dependencies]
env_logger = "0.11"
rustls = { workspace = true, features = [ "logging", "std" ]}
docopt = "~1.1"
env_logger = "0.10"
log = { version = "0.4.4" }
mio = { version = "0.8", features = ["net", "os-poll"] }
pki-types = { package = "rustls-pki-types", version = "0.2" }
rcgen = { version = "0.11.3", features = ["pem"], default-features = false }
rustls = { workspace = true, features = [ "logging" ]}
boring-rustls-provider = { path = "../boring-rustls-provider", features = ["logging"] }
rustls-pemfile = { workspace = true }
serde = "1.0"
serde_derive = "1.0"
webpki-roots = { workspace = true }

View file

@ -2,24 +2,22 @@ use std::io::{stdout, Read, Write};
use std::net::TcpStream;
use std::sync::Arc;
fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
use boring_rustls_provider::PROVIDER;
fn main() {
env_logger::init();
let mut root_store = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
root_store.extend(webpki_roots::TLS_SERVER_ROOTS.iter().cloned());
let config =
rustls::ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(boring_rustls_provider::provider().into())
.with_safe_default_protocol_versions()
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("failed selecting protocol versions"))?
let config = rustls::ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(PROVIDER)
.with_safe_defaults()
.with_root_certificates(root_store)
.with_no_client_auth();
let server_name = "www.rust-lang.org"
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| std::io::Error::other("invalid server name"))?;
let mut conn = rustls::ClientConnection::new(Arc::new(config), server_name)?;
let mut sock = TcpStream::connect("www.rust-lang.org:443")?;
let server_name = "www.rust-lang.org".try_into().unwrap();
let mut conn = rustls::ClientConnection::new(Arc::new(config), server_name).unwrap();
let mut sock = TcpStream::connect("www.rust-lang.org:443").unwrap();
let mut tls = rustls::Stream::new(&mut conn, &mut sock);
tls.write_all(
concat!(
@ -30,19 +28,16 @@ fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
"\r\n"
)
.as_bytes(),
)?;
let ciphersuite = tls
.conn
.negotiated_cipher_suite()
.ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("no negotiated ciphersuite"))?;
)
.unwrap();
let ciphersuite = tls.conn.negotiated_cipher_suite().unwrap();
writeln!(
&mut std::io::stderr(),
"Current ciphersuite: {:?}",
ciphersuite.suite()
)?;
)
.unwrap();
let mut plaintext = Vec::new();
tls.read_to_end(&mut plaintext)?;
stdout().write_all(&plaintext)?;
Ok(())
tls.read_to_end(&mut plaintext).unwrap();
stdout().write_all(&plaintext).unwrap();
}